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of the conduct; 2) the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages; and 3) civil
penalties that could be assessed for the misconduct under state law. BMW v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589(1996).
Westgate's principal focus is, again, the second factor, mathematical ratio between
the total compensatory damages award and the total punitive damages award. That ratio,
Westgate says, is 138 to 1 (or 4100 to 1 if the $500 damages for the vacation were carved
out). (The error of that contention is addressed, supra.) As discussed above, however,
punitive damages awards in cases involving low compensatory damages are consistently
upheld with far greater ratios. See pp. 50-52, supra.
The other two guideposts do not aid Westgate, either. "The most important
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.408, 419,
123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003). In assessing reprehensibility, the Court should consider, among
other things, whether "the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident,"
and whether "the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident." Id. Westgate's conduct in this case falls within both categories. It was
deliberate deceit, and not an isolated incident. See Exxon, supra (repeatedly emphasizing
that there was no evidence of profit motive or intentional misconduct in that case).
In its defense, Westgate can only claim that the consumers were not financially
vulnerable, that there was no fiduciary relationship, and that, somehow, "Westgate's
conduct should be construed to involve isolated incidents in light of the fact that 500
individual claims are being prosecuted." (Westgate Brief, p. 31.) Only by ignoring
55

virtually every piece of evidence at trial can Westgate claim that a resort-wide scheme
involving 2,300 identical fraudulent certificates was an "isolated" incident.11
The third Gore guidepost is the range of civil penalties that could have been
imposed under state law for the misconduct. Westgate's memorandum mentions a few:
the Utah Consumer Sales Practice Act, which would allow for $2,000 per claim; the
Division of Consumer Protection could fine Westgate up to $1,000; the Utah pattern of
Unlawful Activities Act, which would allow for twice the damages sustained (plus
attorney fees, not mentioned by Westgate).
Glaringly absent from Westgate's recitation of statutory penalties is Utah Code
Ann. § 57-19-3(a), a "death penalty" for timeshare companies who engage in fraudulent
marketing tactics. Section § 57-19-3(a) specifically provided (and still provides) that the
registration of a timeshare company to do business in Utah may be revoked if "the
developer's advertising or sales techniques or trade practices have been or are deceptive,
false, or misleading[.]" That would have cost Westgate $20 million per year, far more
than the jury's punishment. See p. 28, supra. Westgate cannot claim that "nothing in
Utah statutes provided notice of the possibility of a $1 million penalty" (Westgate Brief,
p. 33) when it knew that engaging in "deceptive, false, or misleading" sales tactics could
have multi-million-dollar consequences.12

11

Westgate's implications that the consumers were sophisticated and/or wealthy are also
exaggerated. (Westgate Brief, pp. 13, 31.) Westgate targeted consumers with $50,000 in
total family income, hardly in the same league as Westgate. (Trial Exh. S.)
12
Westgate suggests several times that, if the court "extrapolated" from this verdict, it
could view Westgate as having been penalized $33 million. In this context, extrapolation
is synonymous with speculation: It assumes that punitive damages would be sought in
56
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J URISDICTION

Jurisdiction in this Court is pioper pursuant to TTiah Code \nn § 78A-4 103(j).
ISSUES Pkfc^t

V

Ihr following issues au1 presntlui I** lhi,> Court It>i review:
ISSUE No. 1:

DID HIE

IUIAI

mur

\HIISE

ITS DISCRETION IN

CONSOI JDATING THE CASES FOR TRIAI •?

Standard of review:
re^ iewed for abi lse ot disci i tion

\ li ••
Slusk

*

•• ~M ding coi

-.

re

Osmtai "If F.2d 437, 441 (Utah 1989).

Subsidiary factual determination-; In \\\c uui u>u;? a?c reviewed unde a "clearly
erroneous" standard. Stater Pena. So** i; \ i - - * _ ; / ^ *^;»i i.i,, il'*M).
I'H sen Jill in

•'

•

: •'

i 1 mder

U.R.Civ.P. 42 were preserved at R. 4270.
ISSUE N O . 2:

DID THE TRI u * COURT ERR, IN DENYING WESTGATE'S
R IO riON FOR,. A Jl JDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT O.R R..EMFI m JR WITH RESPECT TO PUNITIVE
DAMAGES?

Standard of re viem : „ *ih respect to the trial courts denial oi Westgate's
motion for new trial with respect to punitive damages, the record is reviewed .u novo.
i

-t y (

hud'.

.

,

,

*

•

'

•

v.

Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 Ul 41, \ 31 and n. 13, 82 P.3d 1064. However, the facts from
the record are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Diversified
Holdings v. Gilbei t R 7 w nei ', 2002 1 J 1 129, | 2 63 I '.3d 686 Additic >na. :- , ..
that s\ ere not preserved , oi are inadeqi latel) briefed,, are waived. Fairfax Realn • .•//>/-</.

1

2003 UT 41, | 30 n. 12, 82 P.3d 1064 ("the right to constitutional review of a punitive
damage award may be waived or forfeited like many other constitutional rights").
Preservation:

Westgate did not preserve its constitutional arguments

regarding punitive damages. See pp. 40, 57-60, infra.
ISSUE N O . 3:

WITH RESPECT TO CPG'S CONDITIONAL CROSS-APPEAL,
D I D THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT CLAIMS
UNDER THE CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT ARE NOT
SUBJECT TO ASSIGNMENT?

Standard of review:

Interpretation of a statute is a question of law

reviewed de novo. Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, ^ 11, 108 P.3d 701.
Preservation: CPG preserved this issue in its opposition to Westgate's
motionsito dismiss. (R. 210, 2761.)
ISSUE N O . 4:

WITH RESPECT TO CPG'S CONDITIONAL CROSS-APPEAL,
SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF ATTORNEY
FEES BE REMANDED FOR RECONSIDERATION?

Standard of review: The Court is not being asked to review the trial
court's ruling regarding attorney fees. CPG requests only that, if the court modifies or
remands the punitive damages award, the trial court be permitted to revisit its denial of
attorney fees, which was based on the existence of the punitive damage award.
Preservation: CPG preserved its request for attorney fees at R. 5717.

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann ^ I i-l 1-Iw t MM)1 ,•
'T)
.-nether he >uk.. or is entitled i:. damages 01 oiiieiuise has an
dequate remedy at law. a consumer may bring an action to:
*a)
obtain -\ ilrrlmrUorv ind*Mnent thai an act or practice violates
LIII^> chapter; and
(b)
enjoin, in accordance with the principles ol equity a supplier
*ho has violated, is \ lolating, or is likely n» violate this chapter
! 2)
* consumer who suffers loss as a result of a \iolation of this chapter
may recover, but not in a class action, actual damages or V.J)00 v hic^-uT
is greater phr. cour • -sis.
U.R.Civ.P. 42(a):
When ;-Jlon> inxolxing a common que-lion of law or fact arc pendin^
helore the couri c .-n,,^ order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the malic
in issue in the actions: it max order all the actions consolidated: and it may
make such orders concerning proceeding therein as m<^ - ^ d to woid
i n n e r t ^ a r v costs or Ac\.<\

SI'VTEMENTOFTHECASE
Rather than argue appellee's theory ol the ea«;e in its Statement ol Hie Case, as
W'Vslgate ha - done <T( - picsenls the lollowiiu.'piocedural .uniinan
Nature of the ease, course of proceedings, and disposition below
In 2002, Consumer Protection Group and its founder. Shaun Ade* ix L ,HI ohmuimg
aN>igi

UM-

V^estgate. (Kg.,

•• •

'

Inal Lxli. A (JLxii. fc;, B ^LxL. ,,.,

A\c claims arose out _-i

representations that, if consumers traveled to Park. City and attended a sales presentation,,

3

Westgate would give them a 3-day, 2-night vacation package to Anaheim, California,
which representations the jury found to have been false. *
Upon learning that Adel was soliciting the assignments, Westgate filed a Verified
Complaint and Jury Demand against CPG on September 19, 2002, accusing Adel of
having "stolen" documents from Westgate and seeking, among other things, injunctive
relief. (R. 1-11, f 13.)
On September 25, 2002, Westgate filed an application for a temporary restraining
order. (R. 15.) CPG obtained counsel, and a stipulated TRO was entered on September
30, 2002. (R. 82-84.) The TRO precluded CPG from contacting any additional Westgate
customers, but permitted the use of the contested documents for the purpose of preparing
claims and defenses. (R. 83 % 2.) A preliminary injunction was later entered on similar
terms. (R.2351.)
On October 23, 2002, CPG filed a Verified Answer and Counter-Claim. (R. 136.)
The counterclaim included, among other things, more than 500 assigned claims against
Westgate under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA) and common law
fraud. (R. 118-122; R. 632.)
On November 29, 2002, Westgate filed a motion to dismiss the UCSPA and fraud
claims for lack of standing. (R. 156-157.) The trial court declined to dismiss the fraud
claims, but granted Westgate5s motion to dismiss the UCSPA claims on the ground that
UCSPA claims cannot be assigned. (R. 2339-2340,2346-2347.)

1

Claims involving other promised premiums (e.g., a camera) were not part of the trial,
and are not at issue in the appeal.
4

With leave of court (R. 2630), CPG filed an Amended Verified Answer and
Counter-Claim on March 12, 2004. (R. 2755.) Present counsel appeared for CPG (R.
2720), and a scheduling conference was held. (R. 2724.) In light of the trial court's
ruling regarding its UCSPA claims, CPG moved to amend the counterclaim to add the
individual assignors. (R. 2735, 2744.) Although Westgate had successfully argued that
UCSPA claims cannot be assigned, Westgate opposed the motion on the grounds that,
among other things, the consumers lacked standing because they had assigned their
UCSPA claims to CPG. (R. 2745, 2745f.) The trial court denied CPG's motion. (R.
2753.)
Westgate then filed another motion to dismiss (R. 2760) Among the issues raised
was that CPG's claims "improperly join the distinct and individual claims of over 900
Westgate consumers in single counts in one lawsuit, circumventing class action scrutiny
required by Rule 23, U.R.C.P. for such collective actions." (R. 2760f.) Westgate also
argued that joinder was improper under U.R.Civ.P. 20 (R. 2760r), and that "[i]t is
logistically impossible for this Court to manage over 900 distinct claims in one lawsuit."
(R. 2760u). Westgate said that, if all "900" claims were tried together, and assuming
one-half day for the trial of each claim, "the trial will consume more than 450 trial days,
approximately 2 1/4 years." Id. In response, CPG cited case law that the number of

5

claims is not a basis for dismissal, and that the number of defrauded persons is solely
within the control of the defrauder. (R. 276 li.) 2
In its second motion to dismiss, Westgate also sought dismissal of CPG's
amended counterclaims under the UCSPA based upon law of the case, i.e., the court's
earlier ruling that such claims are not assignable. (R. 2760.) In response, CPG argued
that the earlier dismissal should be revisited in light of intervening case law. (R. 2761bd.) The trial court denied CPG's motion. (R. 2768f.)
In November 2005, CPG requested a scheduling and management order. In its
motion, CPG suggested the court "take a small number (thirty) of plaintiffs [assignors]
who have similar claims in each of four common areas, and separately handle them on
fast track basis. Once discovery has been completed on the thirty claims, the legal issues
can be resolved and trial can proceed on these 30 claims. The outcome of trial will
enhance the likelihood of settlement and resolution of the case regarding the remaining
890 claims." (R. 2780.) CPG noted that doing so "would allow a manageable group of
consumer claims to be resolved on an expedited basis," might resolve some common
legal and issues, and might facilitate settlement, depending on the outcome. (R. 2778.)
CPG referred to the foregoing suggestion as a "small scale trial" or "test" trial. (R.
2777.) Westgate called it a "mini-trial." (R. 2807.) (CPG used those terms only once,
back in 2005, but Westgate continues to use the "test trial" nomenclature (frequently).
E.g., Brief of Appellant, p. 14.)
2

Although both parties loosely referred to 900-plus claims, that was actually the number
of individual claimants. Because a number of the claimants were married couples, the
actual number of distinct claims was just over 500. (R. 632.)
6

CPG stated, "The question now is how to proceed.

CPG has suggested a

reasonable approach: start with 30 claims. Conduct discovery on those claims, try them,
and see what the jury does with them. If the parties do not resolve the remaining cases
after seeing the result, proceed with another thirty. This arrangement - carving a big case
into smaller pieces - is workable regardless of whether the first thirty are deemed to have
any res judicata or other preclusive effect." (R. 2821.) In response, Westgate offered no
proposal for how the claims should be handled, but instead restated its opposition to
joinder of the claims at all. (R. 2795-2819.)
On December 15, 2005, the court entered a Scheduling and Management Order.
The court reserved ruling on how claims would be tried.

(R. 2862.)

Discovery

proceeded on individual assignors, and on April 17, 2008, CPG requested a trial setting
and scheduling conference. (R. 3012.) At a hearing on June 6, 2008, the court scheduled
a jury trial on the claims of 16 assignors for whom discovery had been completed. (R.
3351.)
On August 12, 2008, Westgate filed a "Motion for Trial Order." (R. 4270.)
Westgate acknowledged the trial court's decision to try 16 claims beginning October 27,
2008, "but how those claims are to be tried is still unresolved." (R. 4266.) Westgate did
not make any suggestions as to the manner of trial, arguing only that each assigned claim
should be tried separately. (R. 4247-4270). Westgate's motion was denied. (R.4680.)3

3

Westgate expressed concern that CPG was seeking to "bind subsequent litigation" with
the results of the first trial (or "test trial," to use Westgate's preferred term). (R. 4263.)
CPG clarified that it was not contending that the first trial would have preclusive effect.
(R.4551.)
7

The 16 assigned claims were tried to a jury from October 27 - November 14,
2008. Upon the conclusion of CPG's case in chief, the court granted Westgate's motion
for directed verdict as to one claimant, George Serassio. (R. 4933.) In separate special
verdicts, the jury found by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts had
committed fraud against each of the remaining claimants, and that punitive damages
should be awarded.

(R. 4758-4802.)

Additional evidence was then presented with

respect to the amount of punitive damages. (R. 4749.)
The jury awarded economic damages in varying amounts to each of the claimants.
(($500 (Baty), $508 (Beck), $500 (Brandt), $517 (Brower), $5 (Davis), $550 (Detienne),
$500 (Dorius), $517 (Eastman), $515 (Ellis), $535 (Heser), $505 (Hubbard), $500
(Huntington), $540 (Price), $500 (Sorensen), and $550 (White).) The jury did not award
non-economic damages to any claimant.

The jury awarded $66,666.67 in punitive

damages to each of the claimants, for a total of $1,000,000.05. (R. 4807-4808.)
A judgment was entered on December 11, 2008. (R. 4817-4823.) On December
26, 2008, Westgate filed motions for judgment as a matter of law, for new trial, and for
remittitur. (R. 4835.) On April 6, 2010, the trial court denied Westgate's motions, and
certified the judgment as final under U.R.Civ.P. 54(b). (R. 5829.) Westgate timely
appealed. (R. 5988.)
Facts
Before summarizing the evidence at trial, CPG feels impelled to note that many of
Westgate's "facts" are unsupported by citation to the record. For example, Westgate
begins its brief with the following:

"Shaun Adel, a disgruntled former Westgate
8

contractor fired for falsifying sales records, stole Westgate files containing contact
information of gift certificate recipients." (Westgate Brief, p. 1; also id, p. 4.)
No citation to the record is provided for this assertion, which, considering its
irrelevance to the appeal, appears to be included for prejudicial effect, in contravention of
U.R.A.P. 24(k) (brief is to be "free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or
scandalous matters"). Indeed, the trial court expressly found that Westgate failed to
adduce any evidence at trial to support this claim. (R. 5806 ("Westgate did not provide
admissible evidence, despite its many claims to the contrary, that the Consumer
information was stolen from Westgate.").)
Westgate also fails to acknowledge any evidence supporting the jury's verdict or
the lower court's rulings. Westgate's brief does not contain a true "statement of facts
relevant to the issues presented for review," as required by U.R.A.P. 24(a)(7). Westgate
devotes only one paragraph to summarizing (purportedly) CPG's claims and the
allegations against it, which bear little resemblance to CPG's actual theory of the case.
(See Westgate Brief, p. 6.)
The trial court noted this same refusal to acknowledge any contrary evidence in
Westgate's post-trial motions.

(R. 5806-5807 ("The court notes that Westgate

conveniently failed to present evidence supporting the jury verdict.

This is

understandable because Westgate apparently does not want the court to focus on any
evidence unfavorable to Westgate's view of the case.").)
Additionally, Westgate's few citations to the record are grossly skewed toward a
view of the case that the jury rejected. As an example, with respect to one assignor,
9

Westgate says: "For a claim involving a consumer who redeemed the certificate, traveled
to Anaheim, and took his family to Disneyland, the jury awarded $66,666.67 in punitive
damages." (Westgate Brief, p. 6, citing R. 4758-4772.) Westgate later describes these
same assignors as "consumers who successfully redeemed their certificate and took their
family to Disneyland." (Id, p. 10, citing R. 5668 (Tr.) 753-755.)
Westgate's citation to the record begins on page 753 of the trial transcript, where
Mr. Davis agreed that he was eventually able to travel on the certificate.

But the

witness's testimony actually began on page 741, and painted a far different picture: Mr.
Davis testified that it took him nearly one hundred telephone calls and three years to get
his trip - and even then, he was only able to do so because the regularly assigned
employee, who was a supervisor, happened to go on maternity leave. (R. 5661: T. 741754.) At trial, Westgate's counsel characterized Mr. Davis as "another one that won't
take yes for an answer." (R. 5667:9-13.)4
Similarly, Westgate says that another consumer "was offered an Anaheim
Certificate, but rejected it." (Westgate Brief, p. 10, citing R. 5661 (Tr.) 672-673.)
Westgate omits that, when this consumer was handed the certificate for the first time after
the presentation, she realized immediately that its onerous terms and conditions made it
worthless. (R. 5661: D. Ellis: 670-673.)
4

Mr. Davis would submit three requested dates as required (consumers were not allowed
simply to ask what dates were available). Before each date arrived, Mr. Davis contacted
National Redemption Center, and was told each time that the date was unavailable. Each
time that three dates came and went, Mr. Davis was required to request another form to
request another three dates; he went through this process ten times. (R. 5661: Davis:
741-56.)
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On appeal, the facts are to be recited "in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, f 3, 82 P.3d 1064. Having stated its
concern with Westgate's failure to honor this principle, CPG offers the following
statement of facts, supported by citations to the record:
Westgate Resorts, one of the country's largest timeshare companies with over 1
billion in gross revenues for 2007 and 400,000 owners (R. 5668: Westgate VP Tim
Gissy: 2585, R. 5664: 1695), began sales operation at its "Westgate at the Canyons"
timeshare resort in Park City, Utah ("the Resort") in October 2000.
Prior to beginning its sales operation, Westgate hired personnel with timeshare
sales and marketing experience for on-site managerial positions. Their hires included
Martin Reese, Project Director, and Jay Bryan, Director of Marketing. (R. 5662: Martin
Reese: 1175-1177; R. 5664: Vanhartesvelt: 1813-1817; Gissy: 1705.) At all relevant
times (2000-2002), the directors of marketing reported directly to Tim Gissy in Orlando,
Florida who was in a senior marketing position for Westgate at its home offices. (R.
5664: Horowitz: 1968-69; Gissy: 1704.) Mark VanHartesvelt and Gemstone Resorts
were hired to run the start-up, responsible for opening the resort and operating it at a
luxury resort level. (R. 5664: Vanhartesvelt: 1813-1815; Gissy: 1705.)
Jody Linehan, now known as Jody Wright, was hired as Marketing Administrator in
October 2000. (R. 5662: Martin Reese: 1176-77.) The Gift Room employees at the Resort
reported to her. (R. 5664: David Reed - Westgate's Corporate Marketing Director: 178283.) The gifting department was in charge of providing tours with Premiums and resolving
issues related thereto. (R. 5664: Mark Vanhartesvelt: 1829.)
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During the period in question, October 2000-2002, "tours" were Westgate's
lifeblood. (R. 5664: Mark VanHartesvelt: 1843-44.) A "tour" is a single person or a
married couple induced to submit to a sales presentation at Westgate, wherein a
salesperson would push the purchase of either a timeshare or a VOA (vacation occupancy
agreement). See R. 4756: Trial Exh Q: Confirmation Letters.5
Westgate uses various methods to induce tours and/or guests to visit the Resort,
including telemarketing by its own telemarketing arm; telemarketing by marketing
companies under direct contract with Westgate; and telemarketing by outside marketing
firms through a broker, Marketing Decisions Incorporated ("MDI").

(R. 5664:

VanHartesfeld: 1819-20.)
"Premiums" are the key to getting tours. Premiums are incentives that a tour is
promised for sitting through a sales presentation. (R. 5664: Tim Gissy - Westgate VP of
Marketing: 1716; R. 5663: Brent Ferrin - CPG's expert on the time share industry: 1457
(99 lA percent of all timeshare presentations are induced by offering a premium.) As
explained at trial by those in the time share industry, the better the perceived value of the
Premium, the more effective it is in enticing potential tours to submit to a sales
presentation. (R. 5660: David Wagner - President of Marketing Decisions, Inc.: 587588, R. 5662: 1161 ($500 value is good incentive); R. 5663: CPG's expert Brent Ferrin:
1445-46 (resorts aim for more value for the gift in order to receive the greatest number of

5

In various documents the individuals who accept an invitation are described by
Westgate as "tours" or "guests." Hereinafter the terms are used interchangeably.
12

prospects); R. 5665: Westgate's expert William Smith: 2188 (perceived value of the trip
critical for getting tours).)
The perceived value of the premium will also affect how long a consumer is
willing to sit through a presentation, as well as how well the consumer will respond to the
salesperson. (R. 5663: Brent Ferrin: 1474-75.)
These Premiums are not "gifts" because the recipients travel to the Resort and sit
through a time share presentation in order to obtain the premium. (R. 5664: Westgate's
VP of Marketing, Tim Gissy: 1716.)
According to Mr. Gissy, who oversaw the Resort on behalf of Westgate and was
aware of the revenues generated by the project, the Resort was certainly a profitable
project. (R. 5668: Gissy: 2583-84, 2591.) In the eight months between November 1,
2000 and July 5, 2001, it hosted 7,488 tours, and sold to 1,470 of those tours, generating
sales of $15,221,980.

(R. 4756: Trial Exh. R, Tour Analysis Report (Exh. 529)

authenticated by R. 5668: Gissy: 2587-90.) The project increased beyond that total to
average approximately $20 million a year in revenue, (R. 5668: Gissy: 2585) and had one
of the highest VPG "volume per guest," percentage of sales and average sales price in the
corporation. (R. 5664: Gissy: 1728, R. 5668: 2590.)
Westgate's Relationship with Marketing Decisions, Inc. ("MDI")
Marketing Decisions, Inc. ("MDI"), a broker between timeshare resort companies
and outbound telemarketing companies, entered into a contractual relationship with the
Resort on September 27, 2000 at the same time as Westgate began its sales effort at the
Canyons. (R. 5660: David Wagner - president of MDI: 567, R. 5662: 1028.) MDI was
13

hired to provide Westgate with tours generated through a day-drive program. (R. 5662:
D. Wagner: 991.) From October 2000 through August 2002, MDI provided 3700 tours to
Westgate. (R. 5662: D. Wagner: 1133-34.)
MDI provided Westgate with written "Start-Up Memos" that documented the
important points that Westgate required MDFs marketing firms to disclose to potential
tours. (R. 5660: D. Wagner: 571; R. 5662: Martin Reese - Westgate's Project Manager:
1203; R. 4756: Trial Exhibit S: "Start-up Memos.")
The "Start-Up Memos" were Westgate's only method of communicating with the
telemarketing companies that would be contacting potential tours on Westgate's behalf.
Quoting MDFs president, David Wagner:
A.
When Marketing Decisions, Inc. gives a start up memo to any particular
resort, they are to carefully read it, change it, edit whatever, and then sign it, initial
it and send it back to us. That is the resort's way of communicating with my
company that these are all important facts that should all be given to the call center
who would then use them on behalf of the resort to make telephone calls.
Q.
So Westgate did communicate the requirement to MDI by way of the start
up memo; correct?
A.
Yes. By signing this they're saying that these are the things they believe
are important.
(R. 5660: D. Wagner: 583-84.)
At trial, Mr. Wagner elaborated on the resort's involvement in the
telemarketing process:
Well, generally what we would do is within Marketing Decisions we would
have meetings and put forth ideas of what we felt would be ideal for that
particular marketplace. We would then go to the resort and get the resort's
approval to use that particular combination of gifts. We would ask for that
approval within the start-up memo, that these are the gifts we would like to
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use, this is how we would like to run the program. And they would edit it,
change, approve it, give it back to us, and we would give it to the call
centers to initiate the start.
(R. 5662: D.Wagner: 1035.)
According to Mr. Wagner, if the premium to be offered by a marketing company
brokered by MDI contained any restrictions, the Start-Up Memo provided the marketing
company with a bullet-point list of restrictions that Westgate required be disclosed while
contacting tours on Westgate's behalf. (R. 5660: D. Wagner: 577; R. 4756: Trial Exh. S:
"Start-up Memos.") "It's always given to the resort to sign off and approve and edit if
they feel it's incorrect." "It's to make sure there's no holes in the system." (R. 5662: D.
Wagner: 994; see also D. Wagner: 999.)
Westgate required that all marketing companies with whom MDI contracted only
offer Westgate-approved Premiums.

(R. 5662: D. Wagner: 1102; Martin Reese -

Westgate's Project Director: 1280.) Additionally, Westgate required that "All marketing
materials used by MDI will be submitted to Westgate prior to the use, including all
telemarketing scripts and confirmation materials." (R. 4756: Westgate Trial Exh. 4; R.
5662: D. Wagner: 1105.) Westgate project manager Martin Reese testified that he
believed MDI fulfilled the contract and submitted all marketing materials to Westgate
prior to their use. (R. 5662: M. Reese: 1281.)
It is generally understood in the industry that the company promoting a particular
premium has the right to control what telemarketers say. (R. 5663: Brent Ferrin - CPG's
expert: 1469-70.) Because telemarketers are paid by how many tours they get through
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the door, it is an ongoing problem in the industry to control the telemarketers. (R. 5663:
Brent Ferrin: 1470.)
One of the Premiums purchased by Westgate, and authorized by Westgate to be
offered by the marketing firms, was a 3-day, 2-night vacation to Anaheim, California
(referred to by Westgate as the "Anaheim Cert"). (R. 4756: Trial Exh. S: "Start-up
Memos.") MDI purchased the Anaheim Cert from National Redemption Center, and then
Westgate purchased the Anaheim Cert from MDI. (R. 5662: D. Wagner: 1060, 1093; R.
4756: Trial Exh B: Anaheim Invoices.)
The Start-Up Memo approved by Westgate in December 2000 for three marketing
companies brokered by MDI - i.e., the information that Westgate wanted disclosed to its
prospective tours - did not include any of the restrictions that are contained on the
Anaheim Cert. (R. 4756: Trial Exh. S (2/20/00 Start-up memo)(Exh. 586).)
The remaining Start-Up Memos approved by Westgate omitted or misstated the
majority of restrictions on the Anaheim Cert. Below is a comparison between restrictions
Westgate told telemarketers to mention (Trial Exh. S: Start-up memos) and actual terms
and conditions of the Anaheim Cert. (R. 4756: Trial Exh. U.)
Trial Exh. S: Start-up Memos
(3/20/01, 05/11/01, 06/20/01, 09/04/01,
09/10/01, 10/08/01, 10/13/01, 11/06/01,
01/07/02, 04/25/02 and 06/19/02)

Anaheim Certificate (Trial Exh. U)

1. Room guarantee deposit of $50 per 1. Must pay a $50 fully
deposit per person.
person must be sent in immediately,
rather than at time reservation is made.

refundable

2. Additional tax deposit fee ($35 non- 2. Must pay airport and hotel taxes about
$40 total.
refundable)
must be
sent
in
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Trial Exh. S: Start-up Memos
(3/20/01, 05/11/01, 06/20/01, 09/04/01,
09/10/01, 10/08/01,10/13/01, 11/06/01,
01/07/02, 04/25/02 and 06/19/02)

Anaheim Certificate (Trial Exh. U)
immediately.

3. The original reservation request form, 3. No such requirement.
no faxes or copies, must be received by
the reservation company within 21
days of the date of issue, or the form
will be void.
4. "This is a mid-week trip. It may be
upgraded to a weekend, if available."

4. "Tuesday arrivals only."

5. 1-year expiration
issuance.

from

date

of 5. No such restriction.

6. Consumers not allowed to choose dates 6. No such restriction.
until after sending in the reservation
request form and waiting to receive a
date selection letter from the
redemption company.
7. Consumer must "select three valid 7. No such restriction.
dates, at least 21 days between
choices."
8. "This promotion is subject to high 8. No such restrictions.
season blocked out periods. It is not
valid during major holiday seasons
(this includes one week prior to and
one week following). Major holidays
include: New Years Day, Martin
Luther King's Birthday, President's
Day,
Easter,
Memorial
Day,
Independence Day, Labor Day,
Columbus Day, thanksgiving Day, and
Christmas."
9. Redemption company must receive the 9. "Sixty (60)
choice of valid dates "at least 60 days
required."
in advance of the earliest departure
17

day

advance

notice

1

Trial Exh. S: Start-up Memos
(3/20/01, 05/11/01, 06/20/01, 09/04/01,
09/10/01, 10/08/01, 10/13/01, 11/06/01,
01/07/02, 04/25/02 and 06/19/02)

Anaheim Certificate (Trial Exh. U)
date" [eliminating the last two-months
of the 1-year expiration period].

10. "All requests and correspondence must
be in writing."
10. No such requirement.
11. "No-show fee of $50."
11. No such requirement.
12. "Cancellations must be in writing."
12. No such requirement.
13. Penalties for cancellations may apply.
13. No penalties mentioned.
14. "The package is subject to change
without notice."
14. No such provision.
15. Broad disclaimer of liability.
15. No disclaimer of liability.

According to invoices, between November 1, 2000 and July 5, 2001, the Resort
purchased 2,150 Anaheim Certs from MDI.

See R. 4756: Trial Exh. B: Anaheim

Invoices (showing purchases of Anaheim Certs of: 50 (10/2/2000), 100 (10/9/2000), 500
(10/16/2000), 500 (10/31/2000), 500 (1/29/2001) and 500 (4/3/2001) certificates). For all
except the first purchase, the Anaheim Certs were shipped directly to Westgate at the
Canyons. Id; (R. 5663: R. Romanelo - owner of National Redemption Center: 14091410 (authenticating Exhs. 574-576)).
Represented Value ofPremiums Offered by Westgate
According to MDI president Wagner, Westgate purchased the Anaheim Cert for no
more than $42 (R. 5660: D. Wagner: T. 592, R. 5662: 1060), and as little as $32 (R. 5662:
18
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D. Wagner: 1096), but consistently represented it to Tours on letters and on receipts as
having a value of at least $498. (R. 4756: Trial Exh. Q: Confirmation letters; Guest Room
Receipt (documenting the represented value of the Anaheim Cert as $500); R. 5659:
DeTienne: 109 (R. 4757: Trial Exh. F #0063); Eastman (R. 4757: Trial Exh. H), R. 5661:
Hubbard: 828-831 (R. 4757: Trial Exh. K); R. 5661: Brower: 871 (R. 4757: Trial Exh. D).)
Westgate's senior vice president of marketing, Mr. Gissy, understands that the Cert was
advertised as a $500 value (R. 5664: Gissy: 1720) and Mr. Smith, Westgate's expert,
acknowledged that the perceived value of the trip was $500. (R. 5665: Smith: 2188.)
Unknown to the consumers, the low cost to Westgate of a package that
purportedly included air fare and accommodations was because the Anaheim Cert was a
"breakage" deal, i.e., admitted by Westgate's project manager to be knowingly designed
to be difficult to redeem. (R. 5662: Martin Reese: 1259, 1282.) Many of the recipients
did in fact "break" - after subjecting themselves to the nearly impossible process of
trying to redeem the Anaheim Cert, they gave up. (R. 5659: Eastman: 210; Dorius 25455; R. 5660: Beck: 325-27; Sorensen: 393, 405; Heser: 452-53; Huntington: 604-06; R.
5661: White: 792-95; Hubbard: 822; R. 5663: Baty: 1389-91, 1394-95.)
Although Westgate had represented to the Consumers that they would receive the
premium regardless of whether they purchased Westgate product (R. 4756: Trial Exh. Q:
Confirmation Letters), Westgate did not want Tours who in fact ended up purchasing to
have the same "breakage" experience. Accordingly, Westgate employees stamped the
word "OWNER" on the certificates of Tours who made a purchase during the sales
presentation. (R. 5662: Martin Reese: 1232, 1274-75; R. 5663: National Redemption
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Center owner Richard Romanelo: 1420-22 (owners were provided with "more care/'
"like a VIP," provided quicker problem resolution and might have had a greater
percentage of owners traveling than non-owners).)
Westgate's Project Director, Martin Reese, explained:
Q. What would happen if someone actually bought a time share? Would
Westgate make any effort to actually get them a Disneyland vacation?
A. What would take place at the time is, to my understanding, that the
certificate, if they chose the Southern California certificate, that certificate
would be stamped that that person was an owner, and so when they sent it
in they were supposed to get priority treatment.
Q. Meaning what?
A. Meaning no problems.
Q. Don't reject their application for any number of reasons?
A. Yeah.
(R. 5662: M. Reese: 1274-75).
Westgate's Solicitation of the Consumers to Become Tours
As testified to by the consumers at trial, telemarketers, identifying themselves as
calling on behalf of Westgate, cold-called the consumers promoting the Anaheim Cert, in
an effort to induce the consumers to commit to go to the Resort for a sales presentation.
(R. 5659: DeTienne: 90-91; Eastman: 191-92, 196; Dorius: 248, 276, 298; R. 5660:
Beck: 315-16; Sorensen: 379-80, 389; Heser: 444; Price: 514-15; Huntington: 597-98; R.
5661: Ellis: 658-62; Davis: 728-29; White: 783-84; Hubbard: 814-15; Brower: 854, 857;
Brandt: 902-03; R. 5663: Baty: 1353-54.)
Westgate's expert admitted that the consumers would presume that the person
calling on behalf of Westgate was a representative of Westgate's, that Westgate was
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making the offer, and that Westgate, no one else, was promising them an Anaheim trip.
(R. 5665: Richard Smith: 2164, 2165, 2168.)
During this solicitation, the consumers were not informed that the free vacation
being offered to them had the contested restrictions. (R. 5659: DeTienne: 94-95, 119-20;
Eastman: 196; Dorius: 249; R. 5660: Beck: 319,336; Sorensen: 379-80, 389; Heser: 444;
Price: 516; Huntington: 600; R. 5661: Ellis: 663; Davis: 730, 764; White: 785; Hubbard:
816; Brower: 855; Brandt: 903-04; R. 5663: Baty: 1355-56.)
Shortly before the Tour date, the marketing company mailed Westgate-approved
confirmation letters to tours. (R. 5662: David Wagner: 1046.) The Confirmation Letters
used the Westgate name prominently, gave directions to the Resort and included, for
those enticed by an Anaheim vacation, a statement that the Anaheim Vacation had a
value of $498. R. 4756: Trial Exh Q: Confirmation Letters. The Confirmation Letters
approved by Westgate omitted many of the restrictions on the Anaheim Cert. Similar to
the Start Up Memos, a comparison of the terms and conditions disclosed in the Anaheim
Certificate to the Confirmation Letters reveals the following contradictory or additional
terms:
Anaheim Certificate (Trial Exh. U)

Original Westgate confirmation letters
(Trial Exh Q)

1.

Room guarantee deposit of $50 per 1.
person must be sent in immediately,
rather than at time reservation is
made.

Room deposit sent at time reservation
is made.

2.

Additional tax deposit fee ($35 non- 2.
refundable) must be sent in
immediately.

States only that the recipient is
responsible for the tax deposit
payment.
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Anaheim Certificate (Trial Exh. U)

Original Westgate confirmation letters
(Trial Exh Q)

3.

The original reservation request form, 3.
no faxes or copies, must be received
by the reservation company within 21
days of the date of issue, or the form
will be void.

No such requirement.

4.

1-year expiration
issuance.

of 4.

No expiration date.

5.

Consumers not allowed to choose 5.
dates until after sending in the
reservation request form and waiting
to receive a date selection letter from
the redemption company.

No such restriction.

6.

Consumer must "select three valid 6.
dates, at least 21 days between
choices."

No such restriction.

7.

Redemption company must receive 7.
the choice of valid dates "at least 60
days in advance of the earliest
departure
date"
(which
also
essentially eliminates the last twomonths of the 1-year expiration
period).

No such requirement.

8.

"All requests and correspondence 8.
must be in writing."

No such requirement.

9.

"No-show fee of $50."

9.

No such requirement.

from

date

10. "Cancellations must be in writing."

10. No such requirement.

11. Penalties for cancellations may apply.

11. No penalties mentioned.

12. "The package is subject to change 12. No such provision.
without notice."
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Original Westgate confirmation letters
(Trial Exh Q)
13. No disclaimer of liability.

Anaheim Certificate (Trial Exh. U)
13. Broad disclaimer of liability.

According to the testifying consumers, when they arrived at the Resort for thensales presentation, they presented their Confirmation Letter to the front desk and filled
out a "Guest Information Sheet," which typically listed the Premium offered. (R. 5659:
DeTienne: 112-23; R. 4757: Eastman: Trial Exh. H; Dorius: Trial Exh. G; R. 5660: Beck:
321, 332-33; Sorensen: 388, 390; R. 4757: Heser: Trial Exh. J; Price: Trial Exh. M; R.
5660: Huntington: 601; R. 5661: Ellis: 668; Davis: 736; White: 788; Hubbard: 818-19;
Brower: 858-59; Brandt: 905-06; R. 5663: Baty: 1365.)
During the consumers' tours, an on-site Westgate salesperson subjected each to a
high-pressure sales presentation which often lasted longer than the promised 90 minutes.6
At the end of the sales pitch, the consumers received their chosen premium. For
the Anaheim Cert, this was the first time that consumers had the opportunity to see the
many restrictions that played such a key role in making the Anaheim Cert a "breakage"
deal.

(R. 5659: DeTienne: 109; Eastman: 201; Dorius: 249; R. 5660: Beck: 324;

Sorensen: 391; Heser: 451; Price: 521-22; Huntington: 601; R. 5661: Ellis: 670-73, 700;
Davis: 739; White: 790-91; Hubbard: 820; Brower: 862-63; Brandt: 911-12; R. 5663:
Baty: 1384.)

6

R. 5660: Beck: 322 (2 V2 - 3 hours); Price: 519, 521 (3 hours); Huntington: 601 (2
hours); R. 5661: Ellis: 670 (2 hours); Davis: 737 (2 hours), White: 789 (over 3 hours);
Hubbard: 819 (2 V2 hours); R. 5663: Baty: 1370 (2 V2 hours).
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According to CPG's expert, at this moment, Westgate had committed a "bait and
switch." (R. 5663: Ferrin: 1481; see also, testimony of consumers who believed it was a
"bait and switch" (R. 5660: Sorensen: 436-37; R. 5661: Ellis: 677).)
Upon seeing the previously undisclosed restrictions, two of the consumers were so
frustrated by receiving a premium that was very different than what they were promised
that they simply gave up without trying to redeem the Anaheim Cert. (R. 5661: Ellis:
670-73, 700; R. 5660: Price: 523-26, 546.) Others contacted the redemption company,
discovered how difficult it would be to redeem, and gave up. (R. 5661: Brower: 865-67;
Brandt: 915-18; R. 5663: Baty: 1389-91, 1394-95.)
The other Consumers attempted to redeem their certificates by navigating the
labyrinthian process described on the certificate (Trial Exh U):
• mailing in $135, which had to be received by the redemption company
within 21 days of the consumer's receipt of the certificate;
waiting for National Redemption Center to respond;
filling out a form sent to them by NRC to request 3 ccvalid" dates that
were:
at least 21 days between choices;
at least 60 days beyond the date that NRC would receive the
choices in the mail;
Tuesday arrivals only;
not during (unidentified) "high season blocked out periods";
not during major holiday seasons that include one week prior to
and one week following: New Year's Day, Martin Luther King's
Birthday, President's Day, Easter, Memorial Day, Independence
Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Thanksgiving Day, and
Christmas.
• ensuring that both travelers signed the certificate, lest it be voided.
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Consumers had to wait and see if their requested dates would be deemed "valid"
and available, which, consistent with the "breakage" concept, turned out to be never.
Despite complying with the restrictions, none of the consumers except for Mr. Davis after one hundred calls and a fortuitous baby - were able to travel, even when some chose
to submit additional "valid" dates after their previous dates were rejected for unspecified
reasons. (R. 5659: DeTienne: 122-33 (trying for six years); Eastman: 210 (finally gave
up after 4 attempts); Dorius: 254-55 (tried 2 or 3 times); R. 5660: Beck: 325-27 (made 3
separate attempts to redeem the Cert.); Sorensen: 393, 405; Heser: 452-53 (tried to
redeem 3 or 4 times); Huntington: 604-606 (tried to redeem 4 times); R. 5661: White:
792-95 (filled out form and tried to redeem 4 times); Hubbard: 823.)
Many of the frustrated consumers attempted to contact NRC or Westgate by phone
for assistance. Those who called NRC were told either to wait for their chosen dates to
lapse or to fill out an additional request for dates. (See, e.g., R. 5661: Huntington: 60506; Davis: 741-56.) NRC refused to provide a list of dates that were available. (R. 5660:
Beck: 327; R. 5661: Huntington: 607; Davis: 741-56; White: 793.)
consumers who called it to contact NRC.

Westgate told

(R. 5661: DeTienne: 127-28 ("I called

Westgate at least 20 times." They told me "[i]f s not their problem."); R. 5660: Heser:
453-54 (contacted Westgate 3 or 4 times, they told her to contact NRC.)
Westgate's Knowledge of the Problems with the Anaheim Certs.
Westgate received many complaints regarding the restrictions on, and the
difficulty of redeeming, the Anaheim Certs. In fact, Martin Reese, the project director in
2001, admits that he was told by Jody Linehan, the person responsible for complaints
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related to the premiums, that Westgate needed to get rid of the Anaheim Cert. (R. 5662:
Reese: 1264 ("...I believe that Jody Linehan in our marketing department was the one
that finally said, 'You know what? We need to get rid of this/ because they were having
too many problems with people having problems redeeming it."), 1275). CPG's expert
opined that Westgate was on notice by February 2001, which predated the tours of any of
the consumers at trial. (R. 5663: Ferrin: 1615, 1620-21.)
Often, Westgate salespersons and gift room employees, knowing the real nature of
the Anaheim Cert, tried to persuade the consumer to switch to another gift. (R. 5659:
DeTienne: 101, 106 (sales agent said, "[l]ook, I like you, this isn't in your best interest.
We're done with the sales thing, now for the gift thing. If you want a gift, you should
choose one of the other two because you have a chance of getting something, and this one
we know it's just nobody ever gets the gift. You get a piece of paper that's worthless.
You really need to take the others."); R. 5662: Martin Reese - Westgate's Project
Manager: 1267-68 (Q. "So if someone would come in, having come with a promise for
this and get talked into something else?" A. My answer was, "Yes." Q. "How many
times do you thing that occurred?" A. And I said, "It probably happened a lot." Q.
"Hundreds?" A. "Okay.").)
Despite this knowledge of the difficulties in trying to redeem the premium,
Westgate continued to use the Anaheim Cert (R. 5662: Martin Reese: 1265) until it
learned that CPG had been formed and was soliciting consumers to become part of a
lawsuit. (R. 4757: Trial Exh. B: Anaheim Invoices, Exh. 574-576 (showing purchases of
Anaheim Certs as late at August 14, 2002 and credit for 25 Anaheim certs on September
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17, 2002); R. 4756: Trial Exh. S: Start-Up Memos (June 19, 2002 start-up memo offering
Anaheim trip)); R. 5664: Gissy: 1712).) Westgate filed suit against CPG on September
19, 2002.
At trial, Westgate, MDI and National Redemption Center claimed to have no idea
what the redemption or travel rates (the percentage of tours given the certificate who tried
to redeem them and the percentage who actually travelled) were for the Anaheim Cert.
(R. 5662: Martin Reese - Westgate's Project Director: 1211, 1297 (Westgate not given
the redemption statistics); David Wagner: 1147 (MDI doesn't know the travel rate on the
Anaheim Cert.); R. 5664: Felix Revuelta: 1913 (National Redemption Center has no idea
how many Cert holders actually traveled.).) Perhaps not coincidentally, a MDI employee
admitted that MDI shredded all documents relating to Westgate in August 2003, after this
lawsuit began. (R. 5664: Sherri Miller: 1961-1962.)
CPG's expert found this claimed lack of knowledge especially damning because:
The redemption rate is probably the single most important thing in
my estimation as to the value of the certificate and the value to the
consumers themselves. If you don't know how many people are
actually able to travel, then if I were a consultant advising a
developer, I would say then you're in trouble.
That's one of the most critical factors that you need to understand
about any gift, how many people are actually using it and how many
are using it successfully.
(R. 5663: Brent Ferrin: 1492.)
The expert explained to the jury that the "redemption rate" is the single most
important factor when evaluating the "true value" of the certificate and whether it was
being represented properly to the consumer. (R. 5663: Brent Ferrin: 1492-93.)
27

Consumers9 Assignments of Their Claims to CPG
At trial, the consumers testified that they intended to and did assign their claims
against Westgate to CPG. (R. 5659: DeTienne: 136-38; Eastman: 212-13; Dorius: 25960; R. 5660: Beck: 343; Sorensen: 395; Heser: 462, 466; Price: 539-40; Huntington: 611;
R. 5661: Ellis: 679; Davis: 763; White: 801; Hubbard: 828; Brower: 875; Brandt: 925; R.
5663: Baty: 1397.)
Westgate Resorts' Financial Information
David Crabtree is the Chief Operating Officer for the Sales and Marketing
Department of Westgate. (R. 5668: Crabtree: 2601.) The net equity (net worth) of
Westgate had grown from between $100 million to $150 million in 2000, to $519 million
as of the end of 2007. (R. 5668: Crabtree: 2605, 2621.) After opining that Westgate had
lost value due to the credit crunch, he stated that Westgate believes that the bailout for the
credit industry would help Westgate recover. (R. 5668: Crabtree: 2612, 2630.) The
resort at Westgate at the Canyons has consistently created revenue of $20 to $22 million
per year. (R. 5668: Crabtree: 2607.)
At trial, Westgate stipulated to the instructions given to the jury regarding punitive
damages.

(R. 5668: Tr. 2561-2574, 2577-2578 (no objection to Instruction 75 and 76,

"which are fine"), 2636-2639.) Westgate did not proffer any instructions of its own that
were rejected by the trial court. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Westgate has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in
consolidating the cases for trial. Westgate's principal challenge to the consolidation is
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that the claims were factually "disparate/' but the trial court's finding to the contrary can
be reversed only if shown to be clearly erroneous. Where CPG's theory of the case was
the same for each claim, the alleged conduct of Westgate was the same for each claim,
and even Westgate itself characterized consumers' testimony as redundant, the trial
court's finding that the consolidated claims were "strikingly similar" is fully supported.
Once a common question of fact or law was found to exist, the trial court had
considerable discretion in managing the trial.

Under U.R.Civ.P. 42, the court was

permitted to considered a wide range of factors, such as convenience and judicial
economy. Westgate never offered any suggestions to the court for trying hundreds of
claims, and has not established a basis for criticizing the court's efforts.
Westgate has also failed to establish prejudice. Its argument that prejudice should
simply be presumed fails to meet its burden on appeal. Although Westgate claims that
consolidation allowed the introduction of inadmissible evidence, it neither acknowledges
the trial court's ruling regarding the evidence nor shows the court's evidentiary rulings to
have been an abuse of discretion. Westgate's further claim of prejudice arising from a
failure to instruct the jury adequately is waived because Westgate never objected to the
jury instructions, nor promulgated a proposed instruction of its own.
With respect to punitive damages, Westgate has established neither a violation of
the federal constitutional nor of state law. Initially, CPG notes that Westgate has failed to
provide an appropriate statement of facts or record citations, and has refused to admit that
any evidence exists in support of the jury verdict. Accordingly, Westgate's challenge to
the punitive damages award should be disregarded as inadequately briefed.
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On the merits, applying the seven Crookston factors demonstrates the
reasonableness of the jury's verdict. Westgate's principal focus, the ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages, is largely immaterial in small-damage cases, as
recognized by the United States Supreme Court and numerous other courts. As the trial
court also observed, a jury could have found a high likelihood of recurrence, particularly
in view of Westgate's belligerence and even utter disrespect of the consumers, the trial
court, and counsel.
Analysis of the Crookston factors is also informative on Westgate's federal
challenge:

Reprehensibility is high; the ratio is largely irrelevant, and Westgate's

fraudulent sales tactics could have resulted in a statutory "death penalty" costing it far
more than the jury's award. Westgate's protestations of innocence are too little, too late
- the jury reasonably concluded that, given Westgate's wealth, conduct, and attitude, it
would require an award of $1 million to get its attention.
With respect to CPG's conditional cross appeal, the trial court erred in ruling that
claims under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act are not assignable. This Court has
held that choses in action are assignable, and the trend has long been to expand the field
of assignable claims. The Act does not prohibit assignments, and the trial court erred in
ruling otherwise.
Also as to CPG's conditional cross appeal, (only) if the punitive damage award is
modified or reversed, the trial court should be permitted to revisit its denial of CPG's
request for attorney fees. With respect to the private attorney general doctrine, the court

30

premised its denial on a determination that the considerations raised by CPG were
adequately addressed in the punitive damage award.
ARGUMENT
L

WESTGATE HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CONSOLIDATING
THE CASES FOR TRIAL, NOR ESTABLISHED PREJUDICE
IN ANY EVENT.

Westgate's brief acknowledges that trial courts are afforded discretion in making
decisions regarding consolidation.

(Westgate Brief, p. 17 ("When cases present ca

common question of law or fact/ Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
trial courts discretion in deciding whether to consolidate issues for trial.")) Indeed, it is
"considerable" discretion. Slusher v. Ospital, 111 P.2d 437, 441 (Utah 1989).
Westgate further concedes that claims "can be" consolidated under Rule 42 if
there is a common question of law or fact (Westgate Brief at 18), and that such
consolidation is not "per se impermissible[.]" Id. Westgate argues, however, that there
was no common question of law or fact in this case, because the consolidated claims were
too "disparate."

n

Westgate does not suggest that claims must be identical in order to be consolidated, nor
is there any authority for that proposition. Accordingly, Westgate must show not only
that the facts were disparate, but that they were really disparate. See, e.g., 9A Fed. Prac.
& Proa Civ. § 2384 (3d ed.) ("A substantial common question of law or fact is enough.
If an appropriate common question exists, federal courts often have consolidated actions
despite differences in the parties.")
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Westgate has not challenged on appeal the trial court's ruling that joinder of
claims in the first instance was appropriate under U.R.Civ.P. 20. In that ruling, the court
wrote:
As CPG is quick to point out, Westgate is unclear about what it wants the court to
do with CPG's 950 claims. As a practical matter, since CPG is presumably the
owner of 950 validly assigned claims, the court is faced with two options: (1)
reject Westgate's argument and allow CPG to bring the claims in one lawsuit; or
(2) accept Westgate's argument and force CPG to bring the claims in 950 separate
lawsuits. No doubt if CPG brings 950 suits someone would seek to consolidate
the cases either for discovery purposes or for trial.
(R. 2768f.)
The court then concluded that joinder was proper. The court observed that "CPG
alleges Westgate was involved in a systematic, ongoing pattern of fraudulent activity that
affected many, many individuals," and that such allegations expressly involved a "series
of transactions" as contemplated by Rule 20(a).

(R. 2768f-h.)

Westgate's

characterization of the assignors' affidavits as "fill-in-the-blank and check-box" forms
"only bolsters CPG's position," the court observed. (R. 2768h.)
With respect to the number of claims, the trial court said, "Here, without doubt a
single, massive trial including 950 consumer claims will be costly, time-consuming, and
a logistical nightmare. But, it seems to me, separating the matter into 950 individual
trials only will exacerbate the delay and expense to the parties and increase the
administrative burden to the court." The court wrote:
Westgate claims that a lawsuit involving the claims of 950 consumers, each
of whom may be required to testify, will be extremely time-consuming,
although Westgate's figure of a half-day per witness seems significantly
exaggerated. I cannot conceive, however, that such a trial likely will be
more time-consuming and an administrative headache than 950 separate
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trials, including selecting and instructing 950 separate juries, 950 separate
opening statements and closing arguments, 950 separate plans for
discovery, and 950 separate pre-trial hearings, motion hearings, rulings and
orders, all asserted by CPG as assignee against Westgate, all involving
highly similar facts and claiming essentially the same injury. Indeed, could
there be a better argument for consolidation?
(R. 2768i n. 4.)8
Westgate has not met its obligation of marshaling all evidence in support of the
trial court's factual determination that the claims were factually similar.

U.R.A.P.

24(a)(9) provides: "A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding." The trial court's assessment of whether
common factual issues exist, particularly after the trial, is such a finding. See, e.g., 9A
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2383 ("The district court is given broad discretion to decide
whether consolidation under Rule 42(a) would be desirable and the district judge's
decision inevitably is highly contextual, as the case law amply demonstrates.").
Westgate itself repeatedly characterizes the trial court's ruling as based upon a
misapprehension of the facts. E.g., Westgate Brief, p. 4 ("the trial court chose not to
consolidate 15 similar claims for trial, but instead consolidated 15 claims with disparate
facts"; p. 14 ("The first fundamental error was consolidating 15 disparate claims for trial

In finding joinder appropriate, the court concluded that the claims "aris[e] out of the
same . . . series of transactions." U.R.Civ.P. 20. Based thereon, it is clear CPG is
asserting a series of injuries to a long list of assignors all of which arose out of a single
series of transactions." (R. 2768h.) Rule 42 permits actions to be consolidated for trial if
they "involv[e] a common question of law or fact[.]" The court's unchallenged Rule 20
finding that a "question of law or fact common to all of th[e claims]" precludes a
contention by Westgate that no "common question of law or fact" is involved.
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instead of holding separate trials or at least consolidating claims with similar fact
patterns.").
Rule 24(a)(9) applies to any factual determinations, including those of a trial judge
exercising its discretion. Westgate has not mentioned, let alone marshaled, any evidence
supporting the trial court's determinations that common questions of fact or law existed.
Steele v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n of Utah, 845 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah 1993). ("If
a party fails to provide a statement of the facts along with a citation to the record where
those facts are supported, we will assume the correctness of the judgment.")
No argument can be made that the trial court's factual determinations were clearly
erroneous, or that any abuse of discretion occurred. By the time of trial, the claims had
been narrowed to those involving a single premium, the bogus travel certificate. CPG
had the same theory of the case as to each consumer, that Westgate5 s fraud was complete
at the moment the sales presentation ended, because that was when the "bait and switch"
occurred: Westgate held out a certificate it had misrepresented as worth $500 but knew
was actually worthless.
At that point, the only dissimilarity is one that would exist in virtually all
consolidated cases (and in any case with more than one claimant): the specific amount of
damages to which each claimant is entitled. Even that question involved relatively little
variation in this case. Westgate set the floor for damages by acknowledging in writing
that the value of the Anaheim trip, had it been legitimate, was $500. (See pp. 18-19,
supra.) Added to that were out-of-pocket expenses and other minor, individualized
damages. (R. 4774-4802.)
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Having sat through ten days of trial, the trial court reaffirmed its original
determination that the claims shared common issues - and, indeed, were "strikingly
similar":
The court already meticulously weighed and balanced the factors in
deciding whether to consolidate the claims of CPG. Westgate has
presented no new arguments or case law justifying reconsideration of this
careful decision. Certainly, the striking similarity of the Consumer claims
supported the court's decision to consolidate. This determination comports
with judicial economy and efficiency and avoids unnecessary costs and
delays. Further, CPG had a right to show evidence of knowledge, intent
and plan, pursuant to Rule of Evidence 404(b). Westgate complained of the
'mind-numbing redundancy" of CPG's witness testimony. Separate trials
for each individual claim would have been no less redundant; perhaps it
would have more redundant because witnesses may have been called to retestify in each and every case. The court was not and is not unmindful of
the potential prejudice toward Westgate of requiring a jury to consider
many similar fraudulent acts committed against the Consumers in a single
trial. Westgate argues that its right to defend itself was sacrificed to
judicial economy. This is not true. Westgate still had the right, and
exercised that right, to defend itself against the claims of CPG. Just
because Westgate lost at trial did not mean that it was not afforded an
essential trial right. The court finds that, on balance, the right decision (to
consolidate) was made, and the court will not disturb that decision.
(R. 5805-5806.) Westgate itself complained that the consumers' trial testimony consisted
of "mind numbing redundancy," conceding the similarity of claims. (R. 4918.)
Westgate mentions none of the foregoing, nor even the trial court's rationale for
consolidation. To the contrary, it misrepresents the basis for the court's consolidation
order. Westgate says:
The stated purpose of consolidation was to 'enhance the likelihood of
settlement and resolution of the remaining 485 claims. (R. 2780.) To
facilitate this, over Westgate's objections, CPG was allowed to try claims
with disparate underlying facts so that 'each area [could] be appropriately
adjudicated on a small scale' and to give rise either to iaw of the case, res
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judicata . . . or a strong persuasive precedent to apply to the remaining
claims.' (R. 2778.)
(Westgate Brief, pp. 17-18.)
The partial quotations are not from any ruling of the judge, as Westgate implies.
Instead, they are lifted from a memorandum filed by CPG in 2005, three years before the
consolidation. (In fact, Westgate does not even fairly convey what CPG said. See pp. 67, supra) Before trial, CPG reiterated that it was not seeking to bind Westgate in future
trials to the results of the first trial. (R. 4551). Westgate thus is flatly misleading the
Court when it claims that "CPG was allowed to try claims with disparate underlying facts
so that ceach area [could] be appropriately adjudicated on a small scale' and to give rise
either to 'law of the case, res judicata...or a strong persuasive precedent to apply to the
remaining claims.'"
A party who fails to fairly characterize a trial court's rulings obviously has not
shown that the court abused its discretion. Consolidation is quite context-specific:
Consolidation has been described as a valuable and important tool of
judicial administration. When properly used, it can streamline the pretrial
proceedings, expedite the trial, avoid duplication of effort, and promote
consistency. . . . In order to consolidate actions for any purpose, the court
must first find that there are common questions of law or fact. Beyond that
threshold showing, courts consider and weigh a variety of factors to
determine whether consolidation is appropriate, including convenience,
judicial economy, efficiency, and any prejudice.
1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and Commentary, Steven S. Gensler, Rule 42
(citations omitted); see also Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah
2d 318, 392 P.2d 620 (1964) (court could consolidate three separate condemnation
proceedings involving three separate owners if it so chose); Raggenbuck v. Suhrmann, 1
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Utah 2d 327, 325 P.2d 258 (1958) (consolidation of 11 actions involving 19 plaintiffs for
trial was within court's discretion.)
Westgate also has failed to establish that it was prejudiced by any alleged abuse of
discretion in any event. Each claimant was required to prove each element of his or her
claim. The jury was so instructed (R. 5667: Instruction 35: 2379-80), and the special
verdict required individual findings for each set of consumers.

The court likewise

evaluated the sufficiency of evidence on an individualized basis, granting a directed
verdict as to one couple, George and Darla Serassio, for example, due to insufficient
evidence. (R. 5664: T. 1688.)
Although Westgate argues that certain steps were not taken that were "necessary
to protect against unfair prejudice," its only example is a case in which jurors were given
"a notebook, tabbed for each plaintiff and each defendant, and during the presentation of
evidence the jurors would be given time, as necessary, to make notes." (Westgate Brief,
p. 19.) Westgate says that, "in stark contrast to the special care taken" in that case, the
trial court here only "instructed] jurors that they could take notes but cautioned them not
to 'overdo it and let your note taking distract you from following the evidence." Id., 20.
That argument is borderline

frivolous.

Letting jurors take notes with an

instruction to follow the evidence rather than give them tabbed notebooks (which
Westgate never suggested), if even to be criticized, is "sufficiently inconsequential that..
. there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."
Lee v. Langley, 2005 UT App 339, % 16, 121 P.3d 33; see also City ofHildale v. Cooke,
2001UT56,TI30,28P.3d697.
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Westgate argues that it was prejudiced because, "[a]s predicted by Westgate
before trial, because the consumers each testified as to their own interactions with
Westgate, the jury heard evidence about other alleged conduct it would not have heard
had the cases been tried alone." (Westgate Brief at 10.) Westgate's entire analysis of this
ruling or of U.R.E. 404(b) is a one sentence assertion that the evidence "tended only to
show that Westgate's actions toward any particular consumer were in conformity with
Westgate's general character."

{Id., p. 20.) No, it showed that Westgate's actions were

conformity with Westgate's general scheme, and its general intent.
As CPG's counsel argued, even if the claims had been tried one at a time,
evidence of other incidents would have been admissible, if not required, to establish
elements of fraud such as intent, lack of mistake, etc.:
MR. HUMPHERYS: . . . More importantly, let's assume we were to take
one case at a time. What Counsel has overlooked and has not correctly
stated, and that is in order to establish fraud we have to be able to show
knowledge and intent, and that is typically not shown by one incident,
unless it is absolutely clear.
On the contrary, fraud and intent and corporate knowledge, which is a key
factor in this, is shown by repetitive actions and the actions of the company
toward those problems, because they then begin to show the knowledge of
the company, the intent and the plan of the company to continue on.
So even if this were bifurcated to be tried separately, we would still need to
have the additional witnesses coming in that represent other claims to be
able to show and present the intent and plan of Westgate to continue this
fraud.
(R. 5658: Transcript, September 30, 2008, Hearing, p. 77; See U.R.E. 404 (b) (evidence
of other acts is admissible to prove "motive, . . . intent, preparation, plan, knowledge . . .
or absence of mistake or accident. . . .") The trial court ruled that "CPG had a right to
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show evidence of knowledge, intent and plan, pursuant to Rule of Evidence 404(b)" (R.
5805-5806). Again, Westgate has not acknowledged or addressed this ruling on appeal.
Westgate argues, in a single sentence: "In separate trials, Rule 403 would have
prevented introduction of that evidence." (Westgate Brief, p. 20.) Why? No analysis is
provided, and there is nothing to which CPG can respond. Under U.R.E. 103(a), "[e]rror
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected . . . ." Instead of attempting to establish
prejudice, Westgate asks the Court to presume it from the fact that it lost. (Westgate
Brief, p. 12 ("In support of its motion for JNOV, Westgate again raised arguments
concerning consolidation and pointed out that the result of trial demonstrates the
prejudice of consolidation.5'); p. 23 ("The punitive damages awards confirm that the
unnecessary risk of prejudice translated into actual prejudice.").
In criticizing the conduct of trial, Westgate says the court failed to "instruct the
jury in a way adequate to counteract the merging of all the testimony to consider all the
claims." (Westgate Brief, p. 11; also id ("These instructions were insufficient to mitigate
the prejudice . . . .").) But Westgate never objected to the jury instructions, nor offered
any instructions of its own that were rejected. In Utah, a party who stipulates to, fails to
objects to, and/or fails to offer its own jury instruction has waived any right to claim error
in the instructions. See p. 60, infra.
In short, while Westgate might have preferred dragging consumers back into
court, over and over, to tell the same story to jury after jury, Rule 42 allowed the court to
avoid that waste of time and resources. No error has been shown.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
WESTGATE'S
MOTION
FOR
NEW
TRIAL
OR
REMITTITUR OF THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

Westgate's second argument on appeal is that the punitive damages award
infringes upon the federal constitution, and resulted from passion and prejudice.
(Westgate Brief, pp. 23-46.) While the record is review de novo when punitive damages
are at issue, parties are not thereby relieved of their briefing obligations under the Rules
of Appellate Procedure. A de novo standard of review does not mean that parties may
simply send the record up and expect the Court to start sifting.
Under Rule 24(a)(7), Westgate was required to submit "a statement of the facts
relevant to" the punitive damages issue, supported by citations to the record. Further, it
was required to recite such facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Fairfax
Realty, 2003 UT 41, % 3. Westgate has done neither. See Wright v. Westside Nursery,
787 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (declining "to make a thorough review of the
whole record, which fills a box the size of an orange crate . . . . The very purpose of such
devices as the 'marshaling' doctrine and R.Utah.Ct.App. 24(a)(7), requiring that all
references in brief to factual matters 'be supported by citations to the record/ is to spare
appellate courts such an onerous burden. Absent exceptional circumstances, our review
of the record is limited to those specific portions of the record which have been drawn to
our attention by the parties . . . ."); Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co., 53 F.3d 1531,
1546 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.").
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Apart from refusing to acknowledge any evidence supporting the verdict, or to
recite any facts in a light favorable to the verdict, Westgate's challenge to the punitive
damages claim fails on several other grounds.
A.

The verdict is not contrary to Utah state law.

Westgate argues that punitive damages should be reduced to a 2-1 ratio under
Utah state law, citing Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 809 (Utah
1991) and Diversified Holdings, supra.

No argument is made under the state

constitution.
It is logical to begin the analysis of punitive damages by reviewing what the jury
was told to consider in awarding such damages. Westgate stipulated to these instructions:
[75.] If you find that punitive damages are proper in this case, you may
award such sum as, in your judgment, would be reasonable and proper as a
punishment to the defendant for such wrongs, and as a wholesome warning
to others not to offend in like manner. If such punitive damages are given,
you should award them with caution and you should keep in mind that they
are only for the purpose just mentioned and not the measure of actual
damages. (R. 5668: 2636-37)
[76.] If you award punitive damages against Westgate Resorts, in
determining the amount of the award, you should take into account these
factors: (i), the relative wealth of Westgate Resorts; (ii), the nature of the
alleged misconduct; (iii), the facts and circumstances surrounding such
conduct; (iv), the effect of the conduct on the lives of consumers and
others; (v), the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct; (vi), the
relationship of the parties; and, (vii), the amount of actual damages
awarded. (R. 5668: Tr. 2637-38 [the "Crookston" factors].)
Punitive damages reflect the amount of money that a factfinder concludes is
needed to punish a defendant's misconduct, and to deter others from engaging in similar
activities. In this case, the jury concluded that it would take $1,000,000 to send that
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message to Westgate. Application of the seven Crookston factors (which "share some
similarities" with the federal Gore factors, Fairfax Realty, ^ 31) supports the jury's
conclusion.
1.

Wealth

With respect to wealth, the jury heard evidence that Westgate Resorts' net wealth
was about $500,000,000.00 in 2007. Westgate's CEO testified that the company's net
equity had deteriorated substantially in 2008, but that the company intended to seek
bailout money from the federal government. During the year before trial, Westgate
Resorts generated approximately $1 billion in gross revenues. Westgate Resorts at the
Canyons was a very profitable part of Westgate's operations. Within the first eight
months, Westgate Resorts had generated $15 million in revenue from the resort, after
which it remained steady or increased, annualized between $20 and $22 million in
revenue. (Seep. 13,supra.)
"An extremely wealthy defendant may require a larger award of punitive damages
to be deterred from further misconduct[.]" Diversified Holdings, f 15. Westgate's brief
acknowledges this Court's previous citation to the Seventh Circuit's observation that "a
typical punitive damages award may be around one percent of the defendant's net worth."
Fairfax Realty, 2003 UT 41, p 3 (citing Cash v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., 900 F.2d 109, 111
n.3 (7th Cir. 1990)). Although one might argue that the punitive damages in this case
were too low under that standard, it is certainly understandable, based on the Westgate's
relative wealth, that the jury believed a large number would be required to meaningfully
punish Westgate.
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2.

Nature of misconduct

The nature of Westgate's misconduct, the second prong of the Crookston test, was
a longstanding, highly profitable, deliberately fraudulent scheme.

"Deliberate false

statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, [and] concealment of evidence of improper
motive" support more substantial awards, as do acts involving 'trickery and deceit/"
Fairfax Realty, f 35 (citations omitted).
Ignoring the jury's finding of fraud, its own project manager's acknowledgement
that the Anaheim Cert was intentionally designed for "breakage," and all testimony by
the consumers about their experiences, Westgate describes CPG's claims against it as
involving nothing more than "the difficulty some people experienced in redeeming the
$500 certificates—certificates provided to them by an independent contractor hired by
Westgate."

(Westgate Brief, p. 2.; also id., p. 4 ("Some people found that the

independent contractor made it difficult to redeem the certificates.").)
Adding insult to injury, Westgate argued at trial that, even though its letter
specifically promised "an Anaheim California vacation," a "trip," a "vacation package"
including air fare and accommodations, Westgate's only obligation to the consumers was
to provide a "certificate" for a vacation, not an actual vacation. (See R. 5664: Tr. 1672;
R. 5667: Tr. 2505.)
Westgate's continued deflection to the "independent contractor" disregards
evidence from which the jury could have found Westgate itself blameworthy, rather than
simply a hapless victim of some unrelated entity. E.g., pp. 14-20, 21-23, 25-27, supra; R.
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5668: Tr. 2578-2581 (Westgate counsel acknowledging that the jury might have based
punitive damages on the misconduct of Westgate's own employees, not of agents).
Westgate's counsel told the jury that it could find against Westgate either for the
actions of its employees, or, if certain elements were met, for the actions of an agent. (R.
5668: T. 2655-2656.) Either way, the jury found it appropriate and necessary to assess
punitive damages against Westgate.
3.

Facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct

The next prong, the facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct, is
summarized in the statement of facts above. In essence, Westgate promised people
something it had no intention of providing. When it got caught, it attempted to shift
blame to others, including the consumers themselves and the attorneys who have worked
for seven years to expose the misconduct. (R. 5668: Tr. 2662 (Phase II) (Epstein: "The
probability of future recurrence, zero. There's nothing that can be achieved, other than
the lawyers and others making profits that are off of the back of these consumers to
awarding a large amount of punitive damages when there's nothing to punish, when
there's no future conduct to deter and when the message is not going to be heard by
anybody.").)
4,

Effect of misconduct on the consumers and others

The effect of Westgate's conduct on the consumers and others is what one would
expect from being victimized by a fraudulent scheme. Although the jury chose not to
award general damages, the consumers' testimony regarding their frustrations,
disillusionment, and anger is properly considered on this element. Every time intentional
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fraud is committed by a well-known entity that portrays itself as a solid citizen,
consumers lose more confidence in the integrity of the corporate world and in their fellow
residents.
5.

Motive

The sole motive behind the scheme was profit. It may not have escaped the jury's
attention that Westgate at the Canyons was the only resort to use the "Anaheim vacation"
ploy, and was also one of the more successful locations. It is also reasonable to infer that,
because of the relatively low dollar amount at issue, Westgate assumed that no consumers
could afford, or would have the fortitude, to do anything in response to being defrauded.
6.

Likelihood of recurrence

As the trial court observed, the jury likely concluded that the probability of
recurrence is high. (R. 5804 "(P]t was proper for the jury to infer from the evidence that
Westgate had a calloused attitude toward the Consumers, and that such attitude means
that Westgate would be willing to defraud others.").) Several considerations support that
conclusion.
Remorse - or lack thereof - is a predictor of recidivism. See Campbell v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. {Campbell IV), 98 P.3d 409, 2004 UT 34, ffl[ 29, 35 (after
noting that State Farm had "not voiced so much as a whisper of apology or remorse,"
observing, "We . . . find ample grounds to defend an award of punitive damages in the
upper range permitted by due process based on our concern that State Farm's defiance
strongly suggests that it will not hesitate to treat its Utah insureds with the callousness
that marked its treatment of the Campbells") {citing Diversified Holdings) (identifying
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chief aggravating factor in an award of punitive damages as "a lack of remorse increasing
the likelihood of recidivism")); Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 186 P.3d
1012, 2008 UT App 207, ^| 27-28 (one factor supporting punitive damages award was
that defendant "has never shown remorse for his actions[.]")
In this case, both the jury and the court could properly consider the utter refusal of
Westgate or any of its witnesses to acknowledge any impropriety, at trial or afterward,
and its continued insistence of blaming the consumers themselves.

"Where

is

the

deplorable behavior?" Westgate lamented in its post-trial motions. (R. 4918.) It has been
punished for "acts of unquestioned prudence and good business practice," it said. Id.
This utter lack of contrition - indeed, outright combativeness - was replete throughout
Westgate's post-trial briefing. Even after hearing consumer after consumer lay out their
tribulations, Westgate refused to acknowledge even that MDI or NRC committed
misconduct. See R. 4917 (arguing that Westgate "has been held accountable to the tune
of $1,000,000 for the perceived wrong doing of others") (emphasis added).
Even now, Westgate seeks to smear the victims by claiming that "several were
savvy enough to try to 'game the system' by claiming their gifts without even considering
the purchase of a Westgate timeshare, a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing." (Westgate Brief, p. 40). But Westgate's invitation (Confirmation Letter)
expressly told consumers they had no obligation to purchase:
An informative and relaxing timeshare sales presentation that lasts
approximately 90 minutes. There is absolutely no purchase required to
obtain your gift. This is our way of saying thank you for joining us and
sharing your valued time and opinions about our resort. At the end of your
presentation you will receive your choice of [gift]...
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It is incredible - but typical - for Westgate to attack consumers for believing
exactly what Westgate told them.
Westgate argued to the trial court that a[r]ecidivism is clearly unlikely here
because Westgate completely ceased offering the Anaheim Cert in 2002 and has no plans
to use such a certificate in the future." (R. 4872.) Significantly, however, it only stopped
using the highly profitable certificate when it got caught, i.e., when it learned that this
lawsuit was imminent. (See pp. 25-26, supra.)9
7.

Amount of actual damages awarded

Westgate devotes most of its attention to the seventh element that the jury was
instructed to consider, i.e., the amount of actual damages awarded.

Crookston does

indicate that, as a starting point, a punitive damage award exceeding a ratio of 3 to 1
should be more closely scrutinized than one below that ratio. However, the Crookston
ratios have little or no application to cases in which compensatory damages are small.
Before addressing that key point, an initial observation is appropriate regarding the
ratio. Although it is not dispositive, Westgate has made an odd argument that the ratio
denominator is only $242, not $7,242. (Westgate Brief, p. 5, 24 n. 5.) To get there, it
asks the Court to subtract the value of the promised trip itself ($500). Westgate argues:

Westgate's citations (R. 5668: T. 2613) did not preclude future use of such
certificates; the witness actually said that Westgate does not "now" use air-inclusive
certificates, and that it does not have plans "at this point in time" to use certificates on
which it does not control the fulfillment process. (R. 5668: T. 2614-2615.) In any event,
the jury was not required to believe the convenient testimony of Westgate5s
representative on this point.
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The court distinguished contract and fraud damages in the special verdict
form when it awarded pre-judgment interest under Utah Code section 15-1(2) only as to "each $500 award." (R. 4818.) Under section 15-1-1, prejudgment interest is appropriate only for damages resulting from breach of
contract, not from tort. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (setting pre-judgment
interest at 10% for claims where the contract does not specify a different
rate). Thus, $500 of each of the 15 claims represents only contract
damages.
(/</., p. 24 n. 5.)
Westgate misreads (and misquotes) Section 15-1-1. The statute provides that,
"unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10%
per annum." There is no contract between the parties specifying a different rate; hence,
prejudgment interest is 10 percent.
Westgate claims that pre-judgment interest is only available for contract claims,
not torts, but a century of Utah case law says otherwise: "Prejudgment interest may be
recovered where the damage is complete, the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular
time, and the loss is measurable by facts and figures. Prejudgment interest is appropriate
when 'the loss has been fixed as of a definite time and the amount of the loss can be
calculated with mathematical accuracy in accordance with well-established rules of
damages"7 Encon Utah LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 210 P3d 263, pi

(Utah

2009); Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P.1003 (1907).
Westgate5s counsel admitted at trial, "[W]e have testimony as to the value of the
trip that was supposedly represented, we have testimony and evidence of the receipt
showing that the value or some value, the $500, was attributed to it. We also have a
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witness, an expert, who testified that, in fact, the value was far less. . . . The expert has
said that the value of what they actually received was far less, say zero." (R. 5663: T.
1637.) A proper measure of economic loss in fraud cases is the benefit of the bargain, the
difference between the value of the item received ($0) and the value the item would have
had if the defendant's representations had been true ($500). Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d
602, 609 (Utah 1974).
In any event, as discussed further infra, the relevance of the "ratio" consideration
dissipates when in cases with small compensatory damages.

As this Court has

recognized, there are some similarities between the "Crookston factors" for purposes of
claimed excessiveness under U.R.Civ.P. 59 and the "Gore guideposts" for purposes of
claimed excessiveness under the Constitution. Fairfax Realty, supra, % 31. It is therefore
instructive to note that, in the context of constitutional analysis, virtually all courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, have agreed that the "ratio" factor has limited
or no application in cases where the compensatory damages are small.
Not surprisingly, ratios of punitive-to-compensatory damages awards are often
hundreds or thousands to one when the compensatory award is small. Defendants who
seek to apply a single-digit ratio to low compensatory damages have consistently been
rebuffed, largely because of the absurd and counterproductive results that would obtain.
In American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Miell, 569 F.Supp.2d 841 (N.D. Iowa
2008), for example, the defendant argued that only a single-digit ratio was permitted even
though the plaintiff had only been awarded $1 dollar in compensatory damages. That
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outcome would be both illogical and contrary to the Supreme Court's recent
pronouncements, the court observed:
If a single digit multiplier was applied in this case, Plaintiff would receive
$1.00 in nominal damages and, at most, $9.00 in punitive damages. This
somewhat ridiculous outcome demonstrates why multipliers in these types
of cases are not appropriate. As the Supreme Court recently stated in
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, "the consensus today is that punitive damages
are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring
harmful conduct." — U.S. — , — , 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2621, 171 L.Ed.2d 570
(2008). "Heavier punitive damages awards have been thought to be
justifiable when wrongdoing is hard to detect . . . , or when the value of
injury and corresponding compensatory award are small. . . . " Id. at 2622.
Id., 578 F.Supp.2d at 1284 (ellipses in original).
While Westgate cites Exxon in its memorandum, it does not mention the clear
distinction drawn by the United States Supreme Court in that case between cases with
large compensatory damages ($507 million in Exxon), wherein a smaller ratio is
appropriate, and cases with small and/or difficult to detect damages, in which larger
ratios are appropriate.
Other courts have consistently recognized this distinction, and the corresponding
limited relevance of "ratios" in low-damage cases. With apologies for the lengthy string
cite, see, e.g., Saunders v. Branch Banking and Trust Co. of Virginia, 526 F.3d 142, 154
(4th Cir. 2008) (involving a single violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act where the
plaintiff received $1,000 in statutory damages and $80,000 in punitive damages. In
upholding an 1:80 ration, the court stated the "Supreme Court has long recognized that
greater ratios may comport with due process, however, when reprehensible conduct
results in only a small amount of economic damages."); JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters

50

Bank NA, 539 F.3d 862, 876-77 (8th Cir. 2008) (involving a single trespass where the
plaintiff received nominal damages and $108,750 in punitive damages. The court
reasoned that "[pjunitive damages may withstand constitutional scrutiny when only
nominal or small amount of compensatory damages have been assigned, even though the
ratio between the two will necessarily be large."); Mendez v. County of San Bernadino,
540 F.3d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) Gustifying a ratio of 2,500 to 1, for a single civil
rights violation. In justifying the ratio, the court cited to the United States Supreme Court
decision of Campbell where it states "ratios greater than those we have previously upheld
may comport with due process where a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a
small amount of economic damages"'' 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (emphasis added));
Myers v. Workmen's Auto Insurance Co., 140 Idaho 495, 95 P.3d 977, 992 (2004)
(upholding $300,000 punitive damage award on compensatory damages of $735 (ratio:
408 to 1); "It should be observed that ratios of compensatory damages and punitive
damages are of no real assistance in this case were only nominal damages are sought. A
punitive damage award tied to some ratio would almost certainly have none of the
salutary effects sought to be achieved by a punitive damage award"); Diversified Water
Diversion, Inc. v. Standard Water Control Systems, 2008 WL 4300258 (Minn.App. 2008)
("The nature of the relationship between a punitive- and compensatory-damage award
when only nominal compensatory damages are found differs from the circumstances
presented in Gore and Campbell

Taking their cue from this fact and the flexibility

allowed by the Supreme Court in Gore an d Campbell, numerous courts from other
jurisdictions have upheld comparatively significant punitive-damage awards even when
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only nominal compensatory damages were awarded.

These courts have generally

justified this result by significantly deemphasizing, if not disregarding, the importance of
the proportionality guidepost when nominal compensatory damages are found";
upholding $30,000 punitive damage award with only $1 in compensatory damages)
(ratio: 30,000 to 1), and cases cited; Johansen v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 170 F.3d
1320, 1338-1339 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding $4.35 million punitive damage award on
$47,000 compensatory damages (ratio: 92 to 1); "substantial punitive damages are
warranted for deterrence and, since the actual damages are quite small, must be
somewhat disproportionate to the actual damage award"). See also Ellis v. La Vecchia,
567 F.Supp.2d 601, 610-611 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (higher ratio is appropriate with small
damages; upholding $2,600 punitive damage award on $1 compensatory damages) (ratio:
2600 to 1); Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1014, 1016 (5th Cir. 2003)
(noting that a "'ratio analysis' cannot be applied effectively" in cases with low damages;
upholding $15,000 in punitive damages on $100 compensatory damages) (ratio: 150 to
1); Hadelman v. DeLuca, 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 60, 2003 WL 21493968 (Conn. Super. 2003)
(upholding punitive damage award of $150,000 on award of zero compensatory damages
(ratio: infinite); where little or no compensatory damages are awarded, "the ratio will
always be infinite or a huge multiple"), and cases cited.
The damages in this case were roughly $500 for each set of Consumers, for a total
compensatory award of $7,242.00.

Westgate previously claimed that a $1 million

punitive damage is "breathtaking" (R. 4904), but it would have been more breathtaking if
the jury had found an intentionally fraudulent scheme with multiple incidents over time
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by a billion-dollar company, yet only awarded $14,484 in punitive damages, not even a
blip on Westgate's radar. Such an award would have been .00003 (.003 percent) of
Westgate's net worth in 2007, and .0007 of Westgate's yearly sales at the Resort.10
If its punitive damages exposure were limited as Westgate urges, it would have
been virtually impossible for Westgate's misconduct to be brought to light, or to an end.
As Judge Posner observed regarding a low-damage claims in Mathias v. Accor Economy
Lodging Inc., 347 F.2d 672, 676-677 (7th Cir. 2003), had the defendant's similar
argument been accepted,
the plaintiffs might well have had difficulty financing this lawsuit. It is
here that the defendant's aggregate net worth of $1.6 billion becomes
relevant. . . . Where wealth in the sense of resources enters is in enabling
the defendant to mount an extremely aggressive defense against suits such
as this and by doing so to make litigating against it very costly, which in
turn may make it difficult for the plaintiffs to find a lawyer willing to
handle their case, involving as it does only modest stakes, for the usual 3340 percent contingent fee.
As it is, the punitive damage award in this case is less than two-tenths of one
percent of Westgate's net wealth as of 2007, and between one-half and three-quarters of
one percent of Westgate's claimed wealth as of the date of trial. It is one-tenth of one
percent of Westgate's annual gross revenues, and only 5 percent of the annual gross
revenues just at the Canyons resort.
When viewed from that perspective, the award actually seems low - less than one
percent of a company's net equity (assuming no bailout funds) does not seem likely to
deter highly profitable fraudulent conduct. Stiffer punches have been upheld by this
10

At 3-1, $21,726 in punitives would have been .000043 of Westgate's net worth in
2007, and .001 of Westgate's yearly sales at the Resort.
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Court. See, e.g., Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207,ffif2728, 186 P.3d 1012 (upholding punitive damage award of $34,000 against defendant
whose annual income was $40,000 and net worth $12,000); Fairfax Realty, supra
(upholding punitive damages award equaling 15 percent of the defendant's wealth);
Diversified Holdings at f33 (reducing a punitive damage award to 2.86% of the
defendant's net worth).
Westgate argues that this case is similar to Diversified Holdings, in which the
Court reduced a punitive damage award. Punitive damages are inherently case specific,
however, and the concerns in that case are not present here. For example, in Diversified
Holdings, only a single transaction was involved. Id., ^2. The award was 10 percent of
the defendant's net worth. \ 15. The victim was "a corporation, represented in [the]
transaction by two men with substantial experience in both business and real estate
transactions." % 16. The defendant's fraud was directed at only a small number of
people. ^| 20. This case is not Diversified Holdings, and the jury's punitive damages
verdict is not excessive under Utah law.
B.

The punitive damages award does not violate the United
States constitution.
1.

Gore factors

Because significant overlap exists between the state (Crookston) and federal
(Gore) factors, much of the foregoing discussion bears on the federal analysis as well.
The U.S Supreme Court has set forth three "guideposts" for aiding the Court in
reviewing constitutional challenges to punitive damages awards: 1) the reprehensibility
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of the conduct; 2) the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages; and 3) civil
penalties that could be assessed for the misconduct under state law. BMW v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559,116 S.Ct 1589(1996).
Westgate's principal focus is, again, the second factor, mathematical ratio between
the total compensatory damages award and the total punitive damages award. That ratio,
Westgate says, is 138 to 1 (or 4100 to 1 if the $500 damages for the vacation were carved
out). (The error of that contention is addressed, supra.) As discussed above, however,
punitive damages awards in cases involving low compensatory damages are consistently
upheld with far greater ratios. See pp. 50-52, supra.
The other two guideposts do not aid Westgate, either.

"The most important

indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.408, 419,
123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003). In assessing reprehensibility, the Court should consider, among
other things, whether "the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident,"
and whether "the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident." Id. Westgate's conduct in this case falls within both categories. It was
deliberate deceit, and not an isolated incident. See Exxon, supra (repeatedly emphasizing
that there was no evidence of profit motive or intentional misconduct in that case).
In its defense, Westgate can only claim that the consumers were not financially
vulnerable, that there was no fiduciary relationship, and that, somehow, "Westgate's
conduct should be construed to involve isolated incidents in light of the fact that 500
individual claims are being prosecuted." (Westgate Brief, p. 31.) Only by ignoring
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virtually every piece of evidence at trial can Westgate claim that a resort-wide scheme
involving 2,300 identical fraudulent certificates was an "isolated" incident.11
The third Gore guidepost is the range of civil penalties that could have been
imposed under state law for the misconduct. Westgate's memorandum mentions a few:
the Utah Consumer Sales Practice Act, which would allow for $2,000 per claim; the
Division of Consumer Protection could fine Westgate up to $1,000; the Utah pattern of
Unlawful Activities Act, which would allow for twice the damages sustained (plus
attorney fees, not mentioned by Westgate).
Glaringly absent from Westgate's recitation of statutory penalties is Utah Code
Ann. § 57-19-3(a), a "death penalty" for timeshare companies who engage in fraudulent
marketing tactics. Section § 57-19-3(a) specifically provided (and still provides) that the
registration of a timeshare company to do business in Utah may be revoked if "the
developer's advertising or sales techniques or trade practices have been or are deceptive,
false, or misleading[.]" That would have cost Westgate $20 million per year, far more
than the jury's punishment. See p.

, supra. Westgate cannot claim that "nothing

in Utah statutes provided notice of the possibility of a $1 million penalty" (Westgate
Brief, p. 33) when it knew that engaging in "deceptive, false, or misleading" sales tactics
could have multi-million-dollar consequences.12

11

Westgate's implications that the consumers were sophisticated and/or wealthy are also
exaggerated. (Westgate Brief, pp. 13, 31.) Westgate targeted consumers with $50,000 in
total family income, hardly in the same league as Westgate. (Trial Exh. S.)
Westgate suggests several times that, if the court "extrapolated" from this verdict, it
could view Westgate as having been penalized $33 million. In this context, extrapolation
is synonymous with speculation: It assumes that punitive damages would be sought in
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2-

Harm to others

Westgate argues that the jury's verdict runs afoul of Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 459 U.S. 346, 349, 353-355 (2007). Philip Morris said that, while a jury can
be informed of and consider harm to others in evaluating reprehensibility, it cannot
punish a defendant for harm inflicted upon strangers to the litigation.
Westgate argues:

Id. at 353.

"Where the likelihood of punishing third parties is present, it is

constitutionally inadequate for a trial court to rely on that language alone to ensure that
the jury was cnot asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking not simply to determine
reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm caused to strangers.'" (Westgate Brief, p.
36.)
The problem with Westgate5s argument is threefold. First, as noted above, the
jury instruction that Westgate says created this "likelihood of punishing third parties" is
one to which Westgate stipulated. A party cannot complain about an instruction to which
it stipulated, or failed to object.
Relatedly, Westgate is precluded from challenging the verdict on this ground
because it did not request a "Philip Morris" instruction. Miell, supra, 569 F.Supp.2d at
850-851 (defendant cannot challenge verdict on Philip Morris grounds unless it requested
a jury instruction on that issue); Kauffman v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., 509
F.Supp.2d 210, 214-215 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (same; noting that Philip Morris says a trial

subsequent trials, that the trial court would submit such damages to the jury, that
Westgate would not be permitted to tell the jury about the prior award, etc. While it is
understandable that Westgate would prefer to challenge a much bigger but non-existent
award, the only judgment before the court is for $1 million.
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court must, "upon request," provide such an instruction); Rinehart v. Shelter General
Insurance Co., 261 S.W.3d 583, 597-598 (Mo. App. 2008), application for transfer to
Supreme Court denied; Modern Management Co. v. Wilson, 997 A.2d 37, 53 (D.C. App.
2010); Fairfax Realty, supra, ^ 30 n. 12 (right to constitutional review of a punitive
damage award "may be waived or forfeited like many other constitutional rights.").
Enforcing these established rules of waiver is important in several respects. Both
CPG's counsel and the court relied on Westgate's stipulation in their argument and
rulings.

(See, e.g., R. 5668: T. 2646-2649.)

If the instruction were erroneous as

Westgate apparently contends, it was invited error, and allowing Westgate to raise the
issue now would severely prejudice CPG. Tschaggeny v. MilbankIns. Co., 2007 UT 37,
Tf 12, 163 P.3d 615 ("The invited error doctrine prevents a party from taking 'advantage
of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the
error.'").
"[U]nder the doctrine of invited error, we have declined to engage in even plain
error review when 'counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the
[trial] court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings].'" State v. Winfield, 2006
UT 4, % 14, 128 P.3d 1171, 1175 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). "Our invited
error doctrine arises from the principle that 'a party cannot take advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.'" Id. at %
15 (citation omitted).
More fundamentally, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that state
courts have an important interest in enforcing their established rules. An example is the
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Philip Morris case itself. In 2007, the Supreme Court vacated a large punitive damage
award against Philip Morris, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state
from using punitive damages to punish for harms to nonparties. 549 U.S. 346.
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that "there is a preliminary,
independent state law standard that we must consider, before we address the
constitutional standard that the United States Supreme Court has articulated." Williams v.
Philip Morris Inc., 344 Or. 45, 176 P.3d 1255, 1260. The court concluded that under
state law, Philip Morris waived its right to challenge the trial court's instruction of the
jury, because it failed to proffer an instruction consistent with the requirements of Oregon
law. Id. at 1260-1263. Accordingly, it affirmed the original punitive damage award. Id.
at 1264.
Philip Morris filed a petition for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court
initially granted. The parties' briefing centered on whether the Oregon Supreme Court
was permitted to apply its own waiver rules to a federal constitutional challenge.
http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?
(accessed December 17, 2010). (Philip Morris also argued that the waiver rule was not
"firmly established" or "regularly followed." Id.)
Oral argument centered around the same inquiry, a state's legitimate interest in
applying its own, well-established principles of waiver, even if doing so allegedly
sustains a federal constitutional violation. See Addendum Exh. 3. After argument, the
court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted. Id.
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Unlike Philip Morris, where the cited rule had rarely been invoked, there is no
debate here as to the vitality of Utah's waiver rules. Utah appellate courts have held
dozens of times in recent years alone that a party who stipulates to a jury instruction, who
fails to object to in instruction, or who fails to proffer its own instruction cannot
thereafter claim error on appeal. See list of cases attached hereto as Addendum Exh. 4.
In light of the prejudice resulting from invited error, CPG respectfully submits that
applying these settled principles to Westgate's argument is critical.
CPG also notes that, even without a proffered instruction from Westgate, the trial
court essentially gave the jury guidance on its own. The entire exchange that occurred
during Mr. Humpherys5 closing argument (contrasted with Westgate's excerpt) makes
clear the limited purpose for which the Court permitted reference to other consumers:
At the point of closing argument at which Westgate objected, counsel was
addressing the fourth of the seven Crookston considerations delineated in the jury
instruction to which Westgate had stipulated.

See R. 5668: T. 2646-2647 (Mr.

Humpherys: "In the Jury Instruction, Your Honor, one of the things that the jury must
consider is item Number 4, the effect of the conduct on the lives of the consumers and
others. I'm addressing that very thing.").
In front of the jury, Westgate asked the Court whether counsel would be allowed
to "argue that punitive damages can be awarded for the entire group of people that might
have been affected by this particular premium incentive program; is that right?" (R.
5668: T. 2648 (Epstein).) The Court then stated that counsel's argument would be
limited to the items in the stipulated jury instruction: "He may argue the facts and
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circumstances surrounding the conduct, the nature of the alleged conduct, the relative
wealth of Westgate Resorts, the effect of the conduct on the lives of the consumers and
others, the probability of future recurrence and misconduct, the relationship of the parties
and the amount of actual damages awarded. As long as he's confined to that, that's the
Instruction 76 relative to punitive damages." (R. 5668: T. 2648-2649.)
On its own, therefore, the trial court limited consideration of counsel's reference to
other consumers to the purposes delineated in Instruction 76, to which Westgate
stipulated. Moreover, Westgate had an opportunity to tell the jury its own view as to the
limited scope of Instruction 76, and it did so. (R. 5668: T. 2663.)
Westgate has not shown that the jury's verdict was based upon improper
considerations. Under Philip Morris, a jury can consider harm to others for the purpose
of determining reprehensibility. See id., Ill S.Ct. at 1063 (reaffirming that plaintiff may
show harm to non-parties to demonstrate "a different part of the punitive damages
constitutional equation, namely, reprehensibility") and id. ("harm to others shows more
reprehensible conduct").
Westgate claims that the sheer size of the jury's award, the identical awards, and
the award of punitive damages to Mr. Davis, who (eventually) travelled, must have meant
that the jury punished Westgate for harm to nonparties. (Westgate Brief, p. 36.) But with
this set of facts, it is more likely that the jury followed stipulated Instruction 75, Punitive
Damages as Punishment:
If you find that punitive damages are proper in this case, you may award
such sum as, in your judgment, would be reasonable and proper as a
punishment to the defendant for such wrongs, and as a wholesome warning
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to others not to offend in like manner. If such punitive damages are given,
you should award them with caution and you should keep in mind that they
are only for the purpose just mentioned and not the measure of actual
damages. (R. 5668: 2636-37)
The jury, knowing the facts of the case and familiar with Westgate's wealth,
conduct, and attitude, chose a figure of $1,000,000 as necessary and sufficient to punish
Westgate and serve as a warning to others. Following Instruction 75, the jury did not
tailor each award to the minor variations in consumers' actual damages, it simply divided
the punitive number by fifteen.
$1 million was a reasonable assessment of what it would take to fulfill the
purposes of punitive damages in light of Westgate's conduct toward the fifteen
consumers whose claims were tried. Any suggestion that the jury's verdict includes
punishment of Westgate for harm caused to non-parties is purely speculative, but
Westgate would have only itself to blame if it did.
Westgate complains that references were made by three consumers to "900
people," "hundreds or 1000 people," or "1000; 10,000 misled Consumers," and which
CPG's counsel allegedly referenced improperly during closing argument.

(Westgate

Brief, p. 9.) With respect to the consumer references, Westgate disregards the court's
response. On R. 5660: T. 508, for example, a witness did mention, unsolicited, that if he
had received his trip, "there wouldn't be 1,000 of us consumers out there, or 10,000 of us
that had been misled—", at which point CPG's counsel immediately cut him off. The

13

Westgate's assumption that the jury was otherwise inflamed is contradicted by the fact
that the jurors, despite counsel's urging, calmly rejected every consumer's claim of
emotional distress and general damages. (R. 4802: Verdict.)
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court struck the reference, to which the jury was unlikely to give credence anyway, as it
knew that the entire number of certificates that MDI had provided Westgate was nowhere
near 10,000. The court also struck the other two cited references, R. 5660: T. 560, T.
762.
In any event, any alleged prejudice from a few isolated comments in a 10-day trial
was mooted when the court found that Westgate had opened the door to information
regarding other consumers by affirmatively eliciting testimony from witness David
Wagner about an alleged lack of a high level of complaints about the Anaheim certificate.
(See R. 5662: Wagner: 1114-1115; e.g., id: 1022-1024, 1049 ("I don't remember ever
having any reason to discontinue it [the travel certificate]. That would have been if there
was problems, and I don't believe that that occurred."), R. 5662: T. 1056-1059 (testimony
regarding "small number" of problems with certificate, including that "I have never had
at any of my locations nationwide any high level of bad customer experience or
complaints using the NRC products"), R. 5662: T. 10K0-1082 (eliciting testimony about
"any discussions that you had with any of the management or executive level employees
of Westgate that involved the performance of the Anaheim certificate, complaints about
redemption or anything like that" and "small amounts" of complaints reported by NRC).
CPG was entitled to question the basis and legitimacy ol that key aspect of Westgate's
defense.
CROSS APPEAL
Pursuant to its conditional cross-appeal, Consumer Protection Group requests the
Court to rule on the following issues only if the court reverses the trial court's judgment.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT CLAIMS
UNDER THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT
ARE NOT ASSIGNABLE.

Early in the case, the trial court dismissed the claims asserted by CPG under the
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-11, et seq. CPG lacked
standing to assert the claims, the court ruled, because the statute permits only
"consumers" to bring claims, and thus such claims cannot be brought by an assignee. (R.
2340.) With respect, the trial court erred.
It is well established in Utah that choses in action are assignable. Time Finance
Corp. v. Johnson Trucking Co., 23 Utah 2d 115, 458 P.2d 873 (1969) ("the right to the
proceeds was a chose in action, which could be assigned as any other chose in action").
Assignability extends to choses in action derived from statute. Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah
193, 63 P.2d 611 (1936); see also 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 49 ("Whether a claim is
statutory is not determinative of its assignability or survivability").
In Mayer, this Court noted that "[t]he trend of judicial opinion has been to enlarge
rather than to restrict the causes that may be assigned." Id., 63 P.2d at 616. Consistent
with that principle, Utah courts have recognized the assignability of claims or benefits
unless a statute expressly prohibits it (which the UCSPA does not do). See, e.g., Florida
Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Commission, 2004 UT App 273, ffl| 12-13, 18, 22,
98 P.3d 436 (absent express prohibition, workers' statutory compensation benefits are
assignable by worker upon receipt); see also State v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882, 885-886 (Utah
1996) (judgment for past-due court-ordered child support is assignable); In re Behm's
Estate v. Gee, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1950) (even if cause of action for wrongful
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death was not itself assignable, individual heir's portion of the death claim was
assignable).
Claims for fraud are assignable in Utah, and an assignee of such claims possesses
legal standing to pursue them in court. Russell/Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson,
2003 UT App 316, ffl| 29-30, 78 P.3d 616, affirmed on other grounds, Russell Packard
Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741 (addressing discovery rule under
statute of limitations), citing Mayer, supra.
The fact that a cause of action is extended under the UCSPA to "consumers" is no
more a bar to assignment than the fact that a cause of action for fraud is extended under
the common law to a person who has reasonably relied upon a misrepresentation to his
detriment. In both instances, the original claimant is simply required to meet certain
criteria in order to have a chose in action to assign.
The UCSPA claims assigned to CPG allege that Westgate engaged in "deceptive
acts or practices" (Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4), essentially a form of statutory fraud.
There is no indication in Utah law that the court would apply a different standard for
assignability depending on whether the fraud is actionable under the common law or
pursuant to statute. Indeed, Russell/Packard suggests otherwise.

hat case, the Court

of Appeals found the plaintiffs common law fraud claim "indistinguishable" from
Mayer, which involved a statutory action to recover on a bond for fraud committed by a
securities dealer. See also Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 972 (IJtah
1982) (pleading requirements of R ule 9 are not "limited to allegatioi i of common-law
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fraud," but include all circumstances involving "the kind of misrepresentations,
omissions, or other deceptions covered by the term 'fraud5 in its broadest dimension").
Nowhere in the Act does the legislature prohibit the assignment of UCSPA claims.
A valid assignment confers upon the assignee standing to sue in the place of the assignor.
Moreover, Westgate successfully opposed CPG's motion to add the individual assignors,
in part based upon the argument that the consumers had assigned their claims to CPG
under the UCSPA. (R. 2745.) Having obtained that relief, Westgate should be held to its
position.
IV.

IF THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD IS MODIFIED OR
REVERSED, THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF
ATTORNEY FEES TO CPG SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR
RECONSIDERATION.

In the court below, CPG sought attorney fees on various grounds. The trial court
denied CPG's motion.

With respect to CPG's argument under the private attorney

general doctrine, however, the trial court's denial was based upon the fact that the
punitive damage award addressed the considerations raised by CPG: "Many of the
arguments CPG made in favor of the private attorney general doctrine also relate to its
plea for this court to uphold the punitive damages award. Thus, the issue does not need
to be revisited. The goals of deterrence and punishment are met by the punitive damages
award." (R. 5801.)
If the punitive damage is modified or amended, the trial court should be given an
opportunity to revisit the attorney fee issue.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellee Consumer Protection Group respectfully
requests the Court affirm the trial court's judgment. In the alternative only, CPG requests
the Court reverse the trial court's dismissal of CPG's claims under ihe I Hah Consumer
Sales Practices Act.
DATED this 17th day of December, 2010.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

L. Rich Humphei|ys\
Karra J. Porter
Scot A. Boyd
Defendants/Counterclaimants
Appellees
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WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD, a Florida
limited partnership,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,

RULING

v.

Case No. 020404068

SHAUN S. ADEL, an individual, and
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP,
LLC, a Utah limited company,

Judge Gary D. Stott

Defendants and
Counterclaimants.
This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff's motion to dismiss countsfiveand six of
the defendant's counterclaim. The Court has reviewed thefile,the memorandafiledby the parties,
and the relevant case law and statutory provisions, and being fully advised, issues the following:
RULING
Sometime in August 2002, Defendant Shaun S. Adel formed Consumer Protection Group,
LLC ("CPG") to solicit claims under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA") against
Plaintiff Westgate Resorts, Ltd. ("Westgate")fromWestgate costumers. (Counterclaim ^f 17.)
CPG sent some 1,989 identical letters to Westgate customers advising them that they may have
been defrauded by Westgate, that certain practices by Westgate were unlawfiil under the UCSPA,
and that they may be entitled to $2,000.00 or more under the UCSPA. (Counterclaim f 17; CPG
Letter f^ 1,3.) The letter then informed the costumers that CPG had already invested time and
resources to bring such claims to court and solicited their individual claims. (CPG Letter <| 4.)

nnpi|1

The letter also informed those who had purchased timesharesfromWestgate that CPG would
send an additional letter describing their potential case against Westgate for fraud in inducing the
sale of timeshares. (CPG Letter f 6.) Enclosed with the letters were pre-prepared affidavits and
assignment forms for Westgate costumers to sign and return. (CPG Letter f 4.)
On or about September 25, 2002, Westgatefiledfor a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to prevent CPGfromsending more letters to Westgate costumers until the
conclusion of a trial on the merits. The parties stipulated to a temporary restraining order on or
about September 30, 2002, and CPGfileda counterclaim against Westgate, alleging, among other
things, that: (1) certain Westgate behavior was in violation of the UCSPA, and CPG as assignee
of some 900 Westgate costumers, is entitled to relief in the amount of $2000 for each of those
claims or such greater amounts as may be proven at trial, plus reasonable attorneys' fees as
allowed under the UCSPA; and (2) that CPG as assignee is entitled to relief under the common
law tort offraudin the amount of damages suffered by the assignors as a result of Westgate's
allegedlyfraudulentpractices. These claims represent thefifthand sixth causes of action
respectively as set forth in the defendant's counterclaim.
On or about November 27,2002, Westgatefileda motion to dismiss countsfiveand six of
the counterclaim on the following grounds: (1) defendant does not have standing to pursue those
claims; (2) defendant is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; and (3) defendant has failed
to plead allegations offraudwith particularity. On December 12,2002, CPGfileda motion in
objection to Westgate's motion to dismiss and on January 6, 2003, Westgatefileda reply
memorandum. On January 15, 2003, the Court heard oral arguments and took the matter under
advisement before issuing this ruling.
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Standing

Westgate claims that the defendants CPG and Adel lack standing to sue under the UCSPA
because they are not a consumer of Westgate and the UCSPA specifically limits recovery to
"consumers". The UCSPA provides in pertinent part: "A consumer who suffers loss as a result of
a violation of this chapter may recover, but not in a class action, actual damages or $2,000,
whichever is greater, plus court costs." Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19(2).
Neither Adel nor CPG claim to be "consumers" for purposes of the UCSPA; however,
they argue that the UCSPA does not prohibit assignment of USCPA claims and a valid assignment
confers standing to sue in the place of the assignor. ((CPG Motion in Objection to Dismissal at 7,
citing Brandenburger & Davis, Inc. v. Estate of Lewis. 771 A.2d 984, 998 (D.C. 2001)). CPG
further argues that the rule of assignments applies to statutes that explicitly limit the parties who
may sue. ((CPG Motion in Objection to Dismissal at 7, citing Miami Children's Hosp.. Inc. v.
MalakofE 795 F. Supp. 718 (S.D. Fla. 1991)(granting a hospital standing to sue for a patient who
had assigned to the hospital claims against a healthcare provider)). CPG also sites Msic v.
Building Services Employees Health and Welfare Trust 789 F.2d 1374, 1378 (9* Cir. 1986),
where "the court went on to demonstrate that an assignee has standing even when the claim arises
from a statute that 'explicitly limits the parties who may sue/" (CPGMotion in Objection to
Dismissal at 8).
While this Court notes that the above sited cases are not controlling, it alsofindsthat their
holdings are limited to special circumstances not present in this case. In Msic, the assignee had a
special relationship with the assignors. The assignee was a dentist who provided medical care to
the assignors. The dentist billed the assignors' health provider who failed to pay the full amount of
the claims as required by contract. Misiq 789 F2d at 1376. The court held that the dentist should
have standing to sue as the assignee of his patient because doing so would protect the patient and
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avoid the necessity of the patient to pay potentially large medical bills and await compensation
from the plan. Id. at 1377. Without such a relationship, courts have been reluctant to confer
standing on third party assignees with respect to statutory claims.
Recently, in Simon v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Health Care Plan. No. 00-1331, 2002 U.S.
App LEXIS at **5 (10th Cir. June 11, 2001), the court denied standing to an assignee of a
statutory claim explaining that "[b]ecause plaintiff does not qualify as a party entitled to ERISA
civil enforcement provisions, he does not have standing to bring this action." Referencing Misiq
the court in Simon v. Value Behavioral Health. Inc.. 955 F.Supp. 93, 95 (CD. 1997), refused to
grant an assignee standing, explaining that the "[p]laintiff fails to present persuasive authority
supporting standing of a third party ERISA claim assignee other than the beneficiary's health care
provider." Id. at 95. Likewise, in the instant case, CPG has failed to present persuasive authority
that would support standing of a third party UCSPA assignee who is not a consumer. The case
law provided by CPG concern statutes that either expressly authorize assignment of claims or
involve a special relationship, namely, the physician-patient relationship; both absent in this case.
Considering the language of the UCSPA, and its apparent purpose and intent, this Court
finds that the defendants lack standing to sue under the Act. The defendants, seeking to take
advantage of the statutory remedies available under the UCSPA, must strictly comply with all the
requirements of the Act. Without the specific statutory claim provided in 13-11-1 in sequence, the
defendants would not have the opportunity of alleging the claim set forth in thefifthcause of
action. The right of relief is created by statute and is intended to be restricted to a particular class
of people who qualify under the statute The relief sought here is not a common law relief but a
specific statutory remedy and the defendants do not qualify under the specific class requirement of
the Act
Because the defendant is not a consumer, Westgate is entitled to relief on the standing
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issue with respect to the UCSPA claim. The fact that the defendants have received assignments
from those who may have been consumers does not qualify them as a consumer under the Act.
Therefore, the plaintiffs motion as to standing is granted.
BE.

Unauthorized Practice of Law

Westgate also argues that thefifthand sixth causes of action set forth in the defendant's
counterclaim should be dismissed because the defendants engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law. ((Westgate Motion to Dismiss at 11, citing Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634 (Utah 1944)).
Nelson involved a collection agency who solicitedfromthe general public various claims for the
payment of money for collection. The agency would bring suit if necessary, pay all court costs,
and furnish all legal services in return for afixedpercentage of any sum recovered. 154 P.2d 635.
The defendantsfiledlawsuits "in their own names as assignees of the real owner of the claims."
Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that such activities constitute the unauthorized practice of law,
stating, "[t]he authorities almost uniformly hold that laymen cannot evade and circumvent a
statute such as [the unauthorized practice of law statute] by the device of taking an assignment of
the claim and proceeding in their own names." Id. at 639.
The instant case is similar in all respects to the Nelson case. CPG was formed to solicit
legal claimsfromWestgate costumers, and has agreed tofilesuit in its own name and to finance
and direct the litigation in return for a portion of the recovery. Indeed, the language in Nelson
could hardly be more applicable to this case. "The question as to whether the defendants are
illegally engaging in the practice of law by soliciting the placements of claims in their hands for
collection, having an assignment of the claim made to them, and then proceeding in their own
names as assignees to prepare legal papers, institute law suits, manage and conduct supplemental
proceedings, employ counsel, etc., really presents two problems: First, can they proceed in their
own names as assignees to do the work themselves; and second, can they institute, manage and
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control proceedings and preparation of legal papers by employing a licensed attorney to do the
work for them? We believe that both of these questions must be answered in the negative." Id.
In addition to CPG's business objective and solicitation of legal claims stated above, the
letter sent out by CPG raises additional concerns. In Utah State Bar v. Petersoa 937 P.2d 1263,
1268 (Utah 1997) our supreme court offered the following guidance with respect to the practice
of law: "The practice of law, although difficult to define precisely, is generally acknowledged to
involve the rendering of services that require the knowledge and application of legal principles to
serve the interests of another with his consent. It not only consists of performing services in the
courts ofjustice throughout the various stages of a matter, but in a larger sense involves
counseling, advising, and assisting others in connection with their legalrights,duties, and
liabilities. It also includes the preparation of contracts and other legal instruments by which legal
rights and duties arefixed."Peterson. 937 P.2d at 1228.
Statements in CPG's letter such as "[practices such as those described above are unlawful
under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act", and "you may be able to recover your damages or
$2,000.00 whichever is greater", involve counseling, advising, and assisting others in connection
with their legal rights. Although CPG does not explicitly claim competence to render legal advice
or to take legal action, such competence may be implied by the letter's legal conclusions as well as
the scale ofjustice logo and enclosure of a pre-prepared affidavit and assignment form.
After carefully reviewing the CPG letter and comparing the facts of this case with Nelson,
it appears clear that the defendant CPG has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law as the
Plaintiff contends. However, the statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law in Utah does
not provide for a private right of action. The statute states: "the prohibition against the practice of
law in Subsection (1) shall be enforced by any civil action or proceedings instituted by the Board
of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar." U.C.A. § 78-9-101(2). The plaintiff has failed to
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present persuasive authority supporting standing of a party other than the state bar to assert a
claim under the statute. Hence, while this Court is troubled by the unauthorized practice of law
apparent in this case, it leaves the matter for the Utah State Bar to bring the appropriate action
under 78-9-101.
IIL

Failure to Plead Fraud with Particularity

Finally, Westgate asserts that the claims offraudas set forth in the counterclaim should be
dismissed for failing to comply with Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(b)
states that "[i]n all averments offraudor mistake, the circumstances constitutingfraudor mistake
shall be stated with particularity." After reviewing the counterclaim in its entirety, this Court finds
that it satisfies the requirements of Rule 9. The detailed descriptions of the alleged fraudulent
practices performed by Westgate contmned in counts 68 through 72 of defendant's counterclaim
give the plaintiff ample information to mount its defense and are sufficiently particular to satisfy
Rule 9.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court grants the plaintiffs motion to dismiss with respect to
thefifthcause of action and denies the plaintiffs motion to dismiss with respect to the
sixth cause of action Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare an order consistent with this
ruling and submit it for signature
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER: 020404068
DATED: AUGUST 31,2005

vs.

RULING

SHAUN S. ADEL, et al.,

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

Defendants.

This case is before the court on Westgate Resorts, Inc.'s ("Westgate")
motion to dismiss Counts V, VI, VII, and VIII of defendants' amended counterclaim,
brought by Consumer Protection Group, LLC (CPG) as assignee of approximately 950
consumers who had prior business contacts with Westgate. Having carefully considered
the motion, memoranda supporting and opposing the motion and the prior rulings of the
court, I now issue this ruling denying Westgate's motion except as to Count V.
I.

Procedural History.
Defendants' current amended counterclaim replaces a series of former

counterclaims, thefirstof which wasfiledon October 23, 2002 ("Original
Counterclaim"). Former Count V of the Original Counterclaim sought relief under the
Utah Consumer Sales Protection Act ("UCSPA") and former Count VI alleged common
1

law fraud. Westgate moved to dismiss former Counts V and VI of the Original
Counterclaim. On February 20, 2003, Westgate's motion was granted as to Count V
(UCSPA) claim and denied as to Count VI (fraud).
Thereafter, defendants sought leave to amend the Original Counterclaim to
replace the UCSPA claim with a claim under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act
("UPUAA"). Then defendants sought leave to amend their counterclaim a second time,
seeking to join 950 aggrieved consumers as parties and to add a claim for relief based on
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On October 4, 2004, the
parties stipulated to allow defendants to add the breach of covenant claim, but the court
denied leave to amend to join the 950 consumers.
The amended counterclaim at issue in this motion (the "Amended Counterclaim")
was filed on March 3, 2005. It contains the UPUAA, Fraud, and Breach of Covenant
claims as counts VI, VII, and VIII respectively. It also recites the UCSPA claim as Count
V, with the caveat that "[t]his cause of action has been dismissed ... but is included herein
to preserve counterclaimants' right to appeal." (Amended Counterclaim f 68.)
On March 31, 2005, Westgate filed this motion to dismiss counts V, VI, VII and
VIII of the Amended Counterclaim.
II.

Preliminary Consideration: Application of the "law of the case".
Westgate and CPG each allege that the other is attempting to relitigate claims or

arguments resolved by the court's order of February 20, 2003, which dismissed one count
of the Original Counterclaim while retaining the other counts of the Original
Counterclaim. Westgate correctly points out that the February 20,2003, order is the "law
2

of the case". CPG correctly points out that "[amplication of law of the case should not
depend on whether a particular ruling was favorable to [one party or the other]."
The law of the case doctrine is grounded in the principle that a matter once
decided by a trial court in a case is binding on the parties through all of the subsequent
stages of the same case. It is a doctrine both of judicial economy - matters once having
been considered by the court will not be reconsidered absent unusual circumstances - and
economy for the parties - they will not need to expend their resources to ask the court,
repeatedly, to consider a matter as to which the court previously has spoken.
Under Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Ut App. 1994),
there are limited circumstances under which a trial court properly should reconsider a
prior decision, and this bypass the law of the case doctrine.1 With that checklist as a
guide, in this case I only will reconsider claims or arguments that have already been
adjudicated if the parties clearly fit within one of the grounds for reconsideration set forth
in Trembly or otherwise can demonstrate to the court a sound basis for reconsidering the
prior decision.
HI.

Count V must be dismissed because applicable law has not changed.
With only minor grammatical changes, Count V of the Amended Counterclaim is

virtually identical to the UCSPA claim dismissed on February 20, 2003. Notwithstanding

1

"A Court can consider several factors in determining the propriety of reconsidering a
prior ruling. These may include, but are not limited to, when (1) the matter is presented in a
'different light' or under 'different circumstances;' (2) there has been a change in the governing
law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) 'manifest injustice' will result if the court does not
reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was
inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the court."
3

CPG's argument that applicable law has changed or been clarified, the case it cites as a
change in the law, Russell/Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 78 P.3d 616 (Ut. App.
2003), does not even speak to the UCSPA. As such, that case does not constitute a
"change in the law" that Trembly advances as a reason to reconsider a prior ruling.
Judge Stott had the benefit of full briefing on the motion to dismiss the UCSPA
claim and thoroughly considered the requirements of UCSPA that a consumer suffer
damages in a sales transaction, conditions of the statute that CPG cannot meet.2 He also
considered the procedure under the UCSPA for class actions and its requirement that the
class representative be injured by the improper sales practice, something that CPG also
cannot meet. His decision to dismiss that claim was well-taken. I will not revisit the
issue since the only case cited by CPG as being a change in the law does not even concern
the UCSPA. Count V must be dismissed.
IV,

Count VI may stand because UPUAA claims may be assigned,
Westgate advances two reasons for the dismissal of Count VI. First, it asserts that

CPG lacks standing to bring the UPUAA claims in behalf of the 950 consumers, and
second, the joinder of the claims of the 950 consumers is improper. Both reasons are
similar to arguments rejected in the February 20, 2003 order, but each is sufficiently
different in substance to be considered.

2

Under the UCSPA enforcement actions only may be brought by consumers, by
consumers on behalf of a class of similarly situated consumers or by the Division of Consumer
Protection. CPG is none of these.
4

A,

CPG has standing to bring validly assigned UPUAA claims.

Westgate's standing argument presents itself in two alternative forms. First,
Westgate argues that UPUAA claims are not assignable. Alternatively, Westgate argues
that CPG, as an assignee of an assigned UPUAA claim, does not have standing to assert
the claim of its assignors unless CPG has some injury to its business or property; it cannot
rely upon the injuries to the assignors. I will treat these arguments in inverse order.
1.

Assignees generally have standing to assert assigned claims.

In general, "an assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered
by the assignor." Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000) (this language is technically dicta, since Vermont Agency does
not involve assignees, but articulates a well-settled principle). "This is true even though
the assignment is for the purpose of suit only and the transferee is obligated to account for
the proceeds of suit to his assignor." Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 289 (1939).
Westgate argues from a number of federal RICO cases that the party making a RICO
claim must have been injured in its business or property. Under the analysis of Vermont
Agency and similar cases, however, the injury which CPG is asserting here is the injury to
the business or property of its multitude of assignors. Thus, under Vermont Agency, the
requirement of injury to business or property can be met if the assignors had an injury to
business or property.
2.

No provision of law prohibits assignment of UPUAA claims.

Westgate does not point to any provision of law that would prohibit assignees
from asserting UPUAA claims, nor is the court independently aware of any such
5

provision. Westgate and CPG agree to look by analogy to federal RICO case law, since
the UPUAA, formerly known as the Racketeering Influences and Corrupt Enterprises Act,
was "patterned after the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act"
(RICO). State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), rev 'd on other grounds.
Contrary to Westgate's theory that RICO claims are assignable only under very
restrictive conditions, ,f[l]ower federal courts which have addressed the issue of the
assignability of RICO claims have universally held that RICO claims are assignable."
Resolution Trust Corp. v. S & K Chevrolet, 868 F. Supp. 1047, 1054 (CD. 111. 1994).
None of the four cases on which Westgate relies supports Westgate's position, but rather
in each the assignee had standing to proceed with the RICO case without any requirement
of separate injury or other special circumstances creating standing. See Paolini v.
Goldstein, 200 F.R.D. 644, 645 (D. Colo. 2001) ("Plaintiff-Brokers are assignees . . . [a]s
such the Plaintiff-Brokers have standing to prosecute these claims against Defendants"),
Federal Insurance Company v. Parello, 767 F. Supp. 157, 163 (N.D. 111. 1991) ("The
assignability of RICO claims is not a question of first impression. . . . RICO claims are
assignable"), Federal Insurance Company v. Ayers, 760 F. Supp. 1118, 1120 (E.D. Pa.
1990) ("RICO claims (including claims for treble damages) are assignable"), In re
National Mortgage Equity Corp., 636 F. Supp. 1138, 1152-56 (CD. Cal. 1986)
(comparing to anti-trust claims, "RICO treble damage claims likewise should be
assignable").
Giving weight to the clear statements from a multiplicity of federal courts
concerning the assignability of federal RICO claims and the ability of assignees to sue on
6

such claims as a basis for evaluating the UPUAA case at issue here, I conclude that CPG
has the right, as assignee of the 950 consumers, to sue on the claimed violations of
UPUAA.
B.

CPG's joinder is a permissible under the law cited by the parties.
Westgate's only remaining theories on which it asks the court to dismiss CPG's

UPUAA claims is that the joinder of 950 consumer claims is improper. First, Westgate
claims that this court should dismiss CPG's claims unless CPG characterizes them as a
class action. This argument was raised, considered, and rejected in the February 20, 2003
ruling and I will not revisit that claim. Westgate's second argument, that joinder is
improper under URCP 20, was not raised before. I will consider it now.
1. The court is faced with a choice between one suit and 950 suits.
As CPG is quick to point out, Westgate is unclear about what it wants the court to
do with CPG's 950 claims. As a practical matter, since CPG is presumably the owner of
950 validly assigned claims, the court is faced with two options: (1) reject Westgate's
argument and allow CPG to bring the claims in one lawsuit; or (2) accept Westgate's
argument and force CPG to bring the claims in 950 separate lawsuits. No doubt if CPG
brings 950 suits someone would seek to consolidate the cases either for discovery
purposes or for trial.
2. CPG's joinder of assigned claims is permissible.
The rules of civil procedure draw a distinction between joinder of claims and
joinder of parties. The rules for joinder of claims are fairly relaxed, allowing a defendant
in a counterclaim to "join as many claims . . . as he may have against an opposing party."
7

URCP 18(a). If this is a circumstance where CPG, as the counterclaimant, seeks to join
the claims of its 950 assignors, arguably it is an assignment of claims which should be
permitted under Rule 18(a).
Parties, on the other hand, may be joined only in more restrictive circumstances.
URCP 20(a) requires that joined parties be either (1) subject to joint and several liability,
or (2) linked by "the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences."
In this case it is not altogether clear whether this is a case of joinder of claims or
of joinder of parties.3 But it may not matter.
Here CPG alleges Westgate was involved in a systematic, ongoing pattern of
fraudulent activity that affected many, many individuals. In sharp contrast to the
unrelated creditor claims gathered up by the plaintiff in Stank, what occurred here is a
"series of transactions" as contemplated by URCP 20(a).

3

The Utah Supreme Court considered whether a joinder was of claims or of parties in
Stank v. Jones, 404 P.2d 964, 965 (Utah 1965). There a collections agency acquired "twelve
different, distinct, and unrelated claims" from seven assignors and asserted them against a
debtor defendant in a single lawsuit. The court concluded that "[o]bviously, the seven
assignors could not have joined as plaintiffs and asserted their diverse and unrelated claims in
one action against the defendant. Why, then, should they be allowed to do indirectly what they
could not do directly? The answer is they should not."
In his typical, inimitable fashion, Justice Henriod, concurring in Stank, further clarified
the practical necessity of the Court's ruling in a hypothetical, where a single assignee gathers
the claims of various plaintiffs: "for assault and battery, liability on a promissory note,
reformation of a deed, cancellation of an instrument for fraud, alienation of affections, invasion
of the right of privacy, violation of an agency agreement, claim for wrongful death, damages for
negligent collision, violation of a patent right, a claim for water damage, invasions of the rights
of a beleaguered husband's wife, selling adulterated food, kicking the neighbor's trespassing
kid off his property, and even quo warranto ouster proceedings-all before one bewildered
jury,-and all for a $17 filling fee." He concluded that "Rule 18(a) never was intended to
produce such ridiculosity
" 404 P.2d at 966.
8

Westgate argues that CPG's assigned claims do not "arise out of the same . . .
series of transactions" by pointing out that CPG's affidavit form contains fill-in-the-blank
and check-box provisions that individualize the consumer claims. These provisions allow
the consumers to describe (1) the manner of Westgate's solicitation of the individual
consumer's business, (2) the precise statements, omissions and promises of Westgate
representatives, and (3) the manner in which Westgate representatives allegedly exerted
pressure. Contrary to Westgate's claim, however, where, as here, CPG is pursuing
joinder governed by URCP 20, joinder is proper if the injuries "arise out of the same . . .
series of transactions." Under this standard, the fact that CPG is able to classify its claims
using fill-in-the-blank and check-box provisions only bolsters CPG's position.
CPG's allegations in the Amended Counterclaim are sufficiently detailed to allow
the court to conclude that the events as alleged appear to "arise out of the same . . . series
of transactions." For the purposes of the motion to dismiss I must accept these facts as
alleged. Based thereon it is clear CPG is asserting a series of injuries to a long list of
assignors all of which arose out of a single series of transactions.
Thus, whether the joinder is deemed a joinder of claims under Rule 18(a) or a
joinder of parties under Rule 20(a), joinder of these claims is appropriate.
3. The number of claims is not an obstacle to joinder.
The authority cited by the parties does not clearly address the issue of whether the
number of claims can be an obstacle to joinder, but the cases the parties cite make it
sufficiently clear that assertions of large numbers of claims by assignees is not
unprecedented. In in re National Mortgage Equity Corporation, plaintiff brought RICO
9

claims assigned from "nineteen investor institutions" alleging fraud. 636 F. Supp. 1118,
1143 (CD. Cal. 1986). In Paolini v. Goldstein, plaintiffs were allowed to assert RICO
claims in behalf of "more than half of the 508 customers." 200 F.R.D. 644, 646 n. 4 (D.
Colo. 2001). In APCC Servs. v. Sprint Communs. Co., plaintiffs were allowed to
aggregate "more than 1400" claims for failure to pay dial-around compensation under the
federal Telephone Operator Consumer Services Improvement Act, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12759 (D.C. Cir. 2005). I see no legal impediment to joinder in this case of the
claims which CPG raises against Westgate, even though a very large number of claims is
involved.
4, Judicial economy and substantial justice favor one suit over 950.
Finally, the court has discretion under URCP 20(b) to "order separate trials or
make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice" to the parties. Here, without doubt a
single, massive trial including 950 consumer claims will be costly, time-consuming, and a
logistical nightmare. But, it seems to me, separating the matter into 950 individual trials
only will exacerbate the delay and expense to the parties and increase the administrative
burden to the court.4

4

Westgate claims that a lawsuit involving the claims of 950 consumers, each of whom
may be required to testify, will be extremely time-consuming, although Westgate's figure of a
half-day per witness seems significantly exaggerated. I cannot conceive, however, that such a
trial likely will be more time-consuming and an administrative headache than 950 separate
trials, including selecting and instructing 950 separate juries, 950 separate opening statements
and closing arguments, 950 separate plans for discovery, and 950 separate pre-trial hearings,
motion hearings, rulings and orders, all asserted by CPG as assignee against Westgate, all
involving highly similar facts and claiming essentially the same injury. Indeed, could there be a
better argument for consolidation?
10

In summary, in the interest of judicial economy and substantial justice, and
finding that joinder of so many claims is not inappropriate, I deny Westgate's motion to
dismiss Count VI of the Amended Counterclaim.
V,

Count VII may stand as the adequacy of the fraud allegations previously has
been decided by the court.
Count VII of the Amended Counterclaim is virtually identical to former Count VI

of the Original Counterclaim. Westgate's original motion to dismiss that earlier claim
was denied. Other than the improper joinder claim discussed above, which Westgate
asserts should invalidate all of the claims of the Amended Counterclaim, Westgate's only
substantive argument against this claim is that defendants did not plead the fraud
allegations with particularity. Yet the allegations of this claim are substantially the same
as the allegations of the prior claim which the court previously found adequate under
Rule 9. I see no flaw in that prior conclusion and deny the motion to dismiss this claim.
VI.

Count VIII may stand as the claim is pled with sufficient particularity.
Westgate advances two theories in support of its motion to dismiss Count VIII:

improper joinder and failure to plead allegations of fraud with particularity. Having
considered and rejected the improper joinder claim, I only will review the claim under
Rule 9 of a failure to plead the allegations of Count VIII with particularity.
In this matter Westgate only touches briefly on its claim of failure to plead with
particularity with respect to Count VIII. That passing discussion is inadequate to assist
the court in determining the adequacy of the pleadings of Count VIII. As well, while the
pleading is more spare than it could be, the allegations of misrepresentation resulting in a
11

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing are sufficient. I deny the motion to
dismiss Count VIII.
VII.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing and on the February 20, 2003 order, Westgate's motion to

dismiss is granted as to Count V and denied as to Counts VI, VII, and VIII.
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants' counsel is
directed to prepare an appropriate order.
Dated this j[j_ day of August, 2005.
BY THE COURT:
ANTHONY JV. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(10:02

3

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

a.m.)

We'll hear argument

4

first this morning in Case 07-1216, Philip Morris v.

5

Williams.

6

Mr. Shapiro.

7

ORAL ARGUMENT OF STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO

8

ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

9
10

MR. SHAPIRO:

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice,

and may it please the Court:

11

We are here today because the Oregon court

12

failed to follow this Court's directions on remand and

13

because the ground it gave is not adequate to show a

14

forfeiture of due process rights,

15

This —

this Court vacated after finding

16

that the Oregon Supreme Court applied the wrong

17

constitutional standard, and it remanded with directions

18

to apply the standard that the Court laid out.

19

Oregon court didn't do that.

20

the constitutional issue.

21

refused to follow this Court's direction because it

22

believed there were mistakes in another paragraph in our

23

instruction request dealing with what the court referred

24

to as "unrelated issues."

25

But the

It never even addressed

The Oregon court, of course,

But that isn't what this Court mandated.
3
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1

And the specific forfeiture theory adopted here for the

2

first time after nine years of appellate litigation is

3

completely inadequate to avoid this mandate.

4

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

Mr. Shapiro, we are

5

dealing with a State supreme court, and our bottom line

6

always reads "for further proceedings not inconsistent

7

with this opinion."

8

State court can resolve a case on an alternate State law

9

ground, if there is such a ground in the case.

10

And it was my understanding that a

MR. SHAPIRO:

Yes, Your Honor.

We believe

11

that this disposition is quite inconsistent with what

12

the Court mandated.

13

case

14

still mandated an application of the constitutional

15

standard, including the prohibition on punishment for

16

harm to non-parties, and that standard simply was never

17

applied.

18'

opinion.

19

The Court heard arguments in this

about the "correct in all respects" rule, but it

We say that is inconsistent with this Court's

JUSTICE SOUTER:

But it seems to me the

20

problem with the argument is that to say it is

21

inconsistent with the opinion we implicitly have to say

22

that the Oregon Supreme Court has to confront State law

23

issues in a certain sequence, and that if it does not do

24

so those issues are waived, as it were, not only by the

25

court but by the party who raised it.
4
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1

difficulty, I think, with your position here is that on

2

the assumption, which I do make, that the —

3

issue, "correct in all respect" issue, was properly

4

raised by the other side, if we accept your position, we

5

in effect are saying the other side is not going to have

6

an opportunity to argue that before the Oregon Supreme

7

Court,

8

for you to climb.

that the

And thatfs, it seems to me, kind of a steep hill

9

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, we don't say that the

10

court can never adopt a State law standard after remand

11

from this Court, but we say that this disposition is

12

inconsistent

13

—
JUSTICE SOUTER:

I know you are saying that

14

but why —

15

for not entail what I just said, and that is, in effect

16

you cut off the claim by a party raised before the

17

Oregon Supreme Court, not considered by the Oregon

18

Supreme Court, and you cut off that claim simply because

19

the Oregon Supreme Court chose to approach the issues in

20

the case in a certain sequence?

21

have to do that?

22

why does the disposition that you are asking

MR. SHAPIRO:

What business do we

Well, because the preservation

23

issue was debated before this Court and it adopted a

24

specific order here saying on remand now consider the

25

constitutional standard, which is the prohibition on —
5
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1
2

JUSTICE SOUTER:

I know the language that

you are referring to.

3

MR. SHAPIRO: Yes.

4

JUSTICE SOUTER:

But the referring to that

5

language simply skips over the issue that I am trying to

6

raise.

7

concerned with if we accept your position in cutting off

8

the claim made by one party to the case which was never

9

heard by the Oregon Supreme Court?

Isn't there a problem that we should be

10

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, Your Honor, this is very

11

similar to what occurred in the Sullivan case in this

12

Court, where the issue of preservation was debated

13

before this Court at the cert stage in the cert papers,

14

and the Court said:

15

adequacy of the State ground when we CDRed the case.

16

We sub silentio passed on the

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

Didn't —

did the

17

Court -- suppose the —

what is it called -- "correct in

18

all respects" had been raised and decided by the Oregon

19

Supreme Court in the first instance.

20

said, well, we don't have to deal with whether

21

Instruction 34 was right or wrong in this particular,

22

because it was wrong in other respects.

23

had been the first time around what the Oregon Supreme

24

Court said.

25

process?

Suppose it had

Suppose that

Would that have offended any Federal due

Would that have been an appropriate
6
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1

disposition for the Oregon Supreme Court to make?

2

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, that takes us to our

3

second and principal argument, which is that that ground

4

would not be adequate under this Court's criteria for

5

adequacy.

6

reasons why that would not be an adequate ground for

7

forfeiting this constitutional right.

8

It was a surprise ruling that we couldn't anticipate.

9

It is an exercise in futility because, even if we

And we say that there are really three

It's an ambush.

10

submitted a perfect instruction that complied with that

11

rule, we would have been rejected anyway by the trial

12

court that simply believed that this instruction wasn't

13

required by the —

14
15

JUSTICE SOUTER:

Isn't the place to make

that argument in the Oregon Supreme Court?

16

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, no.

The Oregon Supreme

17
18

JUSTICE SOUTER:

Wouldn't it have been

19

appropriate to -- to hear the —

20

raising and for you to make the reply that you have just

21

made?

22

MR. SHAPIRO:

the issue that they are

Your Honor, this Court has

23

said repeatedly that adequacy is a Federal law question

24

for this Court to decide.

25

JUSTICE SOUTER:

I realize it's a Federal
7
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1

law question and in approaching that question, I keep

2

asking the question which I think I have now put to you

3

three times and have yet to hear an answer on the merits

4

on:

5

that cuts off the right of a party that properly raised

6

an issue in the Oregon Supreme Court and has yet to be

7

heard on the merits in the Oregon Supreme Court?

Why is it appropriate for us to have a rule here

8
9

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, there are two reasons.

First under the adequacy decisions of this Court,

10

including Lee v. Kemna, if it takes years and years

11

after the trial to articulate a forfeiture rule like

12

this that counts heavily against the adequacy of the

13

State ground.

14

recently.

15

This Court held that in Lee v. Kemna very

And then secondly, this is a point that was

16

argued to this Court four separate times now and when

17

the Court remanded with explicit directions to apply the

18

constitutional standard that's something that had to be

19

done on remand.

20

court to get into the question of whether this request

21

was made.

22

The Court did not invite the lower

The Court found that the request was made.
JUSTICE SOUTER:

Maybe —

maybe this Court

23

insufficiently appreciated the significance of the issue

24

which is now before us.

25

there a good reason on the merits why it is fair for us

And I still want to know, is

8
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1

to cut off the right of the other side to raise an issue

2

that they raise or to argue an issue that they raised in

3

a timely fashion?

4

MR. SHAPIRO:

Yes, there is a good reason,

5

because this is -- adequacy is ultimately a Federal

6

question for this Court to decide.

7

debated here four separate times at great length.

8

Court remanded for a specific decision by the lower

9

court.

10
11
12
13

That wasn't done.

The issue was
The

And if we turn to the

adequacy doctrine —
JUSTICE SCALIA:

Excuse me.

What —

what

issue was debated here four times?
MR. SHAPIRO:

Whether or not there was an

14

adequate State ground because of the "correct in all

15

respects" rule.

16

in the cert oppositions twice.

17

the cert opposition this time around.

18

never accepted it.

19
20

That was debated in the merits brief,

JUSTICE STEVENS:

MR. SHAPIRO:

22

JUSTICE STEVENS:

24
25

But the Court has

But the State court hadn't

ruled on it at that time.

21

23

It was debated again in

That's correct.
So how do we rule on it as

a matter of first impression?
MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, because, Your Honor, the

Court considered, just as it did in Sullivan, it
9
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1

considered these issues in the cert papers and then

2

remanded the case

3

the lower court.

4
5

for a different issue to be decided by

But we don't hesitate from debating the
adequacy issue.

6

JUSTICE SCALIA:
that question?

Did our opinion decide that

7

—

8

question was decided against your opponent?

9
10

Did our opinion say that that

MR. SHAPIRO:

No.

What the Court said in

Sullivan was that it was a sub silentio determination.

11

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

How could we have

12

determined it when the Oregon Supreme Court itself

13

hadn't made any determination?

14
15

MR. SHAPIRO:

Because the parties debated

this extensively in their briefs.

16

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

But we don't decide

17

questions, particularly questions of State law, that may

18

have a Federal check.

19

first instance.

20

But we don't decide them in the

And there's one point, Mr. Shapiro, that I

21

think affects this concern of fairness to the parties

22

who raised this "correct in all respects" from the

23

beginning.

24

the Williams case itself, the rule about harm to others.

25

In State Farm we were talking about harm to

This Court had not clarified, had it, until

10
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1

nonresidents.

So if I recall correctly, Williams was

2

the first time we ever clarified that harm to others

3

included people within the same State; is that correct?

4

MR. SHAPIRO:

Yes.

That's true.

5

This -- this, as the Court expressed it, was

6

a slight extension of the previous decisions.

7

Honor, if the Court feel that this adequacy issue hasn't

8

been dealt with previously by this Court, it's presented

9

squarely here.

It is a Federal question, which this

10

Court says has to be decided by this Court.

11

don't hesitate from —

12

But Your

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

And we

I suppose one reason

13

—

14

that, unlike the other situations you have discussed, it

15

would not have been a bar to our consideration of this

16

case the last time because, just as you raise the

17

question in your second question presented that whether

18

the award complies with due process, we may have thought

19

there might have been an adequate and independent State

20

ground on a procedural question, but we were going to go

21

ahead.

22

whether the damages award was unconstitutional.

23

one reason to think it may not have been decided is

We granted cert on the substantive question on

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, Your Honor, if —

if

24

we're not right about the decision resolving the

25

adequacy issue already, we're happy to turn to it now
11
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1

and address it as we do in our briefs.

2

adequate State ground under this Court's decisions.

3

first reason for that is that this is a futile gesture

4

that the State court requires of us.

5

JUSTICE STEVENS:

This is not an
The

I want to ask you about

6

that.

That's the thrust of your argument:

It would

7

have been futile to comply with the specific, drafting a

8

perfect —

9

respects."

perfect instruction "correct in all
But I have to think the trial -- the record

10

is subject to the reading that the trial judge thought

11

the issue had already been adequately taken care of,

12

rather than it would be an incorrect instruction.

13

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, the trial judge asked,

14

is there any authority that requires me to give this

15

instruction on harm to non-parties?

16

view it's the BMW case.

17

not an authority right on point Ifm not going to give

18

this instruction.

19

submitted a separate piece of paper, it would have made

20

no difference; and if we had taken out the two mistakes

And we said, in our

And she said, well, if there is

She said that very clearly.

So if we

21
22

JUSTICE STEVENS:

Where in the record is the

23

portion of the colloquy about the instructions most

24

clearly stated in your view, on your side of that issue?

25

MR. SHAPIRO:

Let's see.
12
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1

instruction conference.

2

Mr. Beaty starts discussing the second prong of this

3

paragraph.

4

judge -- the judge says:

5

covered by giving an instruction that punitive damages

6

are not compensatory."

7

not —

8

This is pages 17 and 18a.

9

He says —

This begins on page 17a, where

he quotes the language, and the
"Well, I think that that's

And he says:

No, no, that is

"That is not the point of this instruction."

JUSTICE STEVENS:

But that's exactly the

10

point I make.

11

think it's already covered, which is different from

12

saying, no matter how you phrase it, I won't give it.

13

I think the trial judge was saying, I

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, she said she just

14

disagreed with the idea that there should be protection

15

against punishment for harm to non-parties.

16

said unless there's a case requiring that, I'm not going

17

to give that instruction.

18

And she said

JUSTICE SOUTER:

And she

—

Didn't she also say that

19

she was going to give, and ultimately did give an

20

instruction, to the effect that punitive damages are

21

punitive, they are not for the compensation of this

22

person or any other person, and to —

23

Philip Morris's counsel and said:

24

Philip Morris's counsel said okay.

25

MR. SHAPIRO:

she then turned to

What about that?

What he was saying when he

13
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1

said okay was:

2

going to continue to argue a point that I f ve already

3

lost.

But he pressed that point

4
5

I understand your ruling and I'm not

JUSTICE SOUTER:

—

It doesn't sound like much

of an objection.

6

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, the —

the State courts

7

both held -- both of the appellate courts held our

8

instruction was rejected.

9

rejected, too, in its opinion.

And this Court said it was
And that's exactly

10

right.

You can't antagonize the trial judge by arguing

11

and arguing after your position has been rejected.

12

JUSTICE BREYER:

But —

but the —

the

13

problem that I am having at the moment is that they did

14

-- from your point of view, is that they -- the other

15

side listed 28 cases in which they said the Oregon

16

courts have followed this rule that the instruction has

17

to be good as a whole.

18

Now, I have looked up those 28 cases, and

19

they do —

they do say that.

They do say it, or they

20

imply it, or they apply it.

21

point, but they are not completely out of point, either.

22

And —

23

there just looked at this instruction on 32(a).

24

looks like sort of it's all together.

25

look like it's all together, the (1) and the (2). And

They are not completely on

and so I suppose what happened is that the judge

14
Alderson Reporting Company

It

It really does

Official - Subject to Final Review

1

he ran his eye down the page and he said, well, here are

2

two other ways in which it's no good, and so that's the

3

end of it.

4

should have had four instructions instead of one, but

5

you did just have one.

You can't raise your objection.

6

Maybe you

And under Oregon law, unless every part of

7

it is right, the judge is correct m

8

if he never mentions the other part.

9

does seem as if that's what those 28 cases do say.

10

not giving it, even
And that 28 —

it
So

what do we say about that?

11

MR. SHAPIRO:

The —

the reason we say that

12

those 28 cases did not give us reasonable notice that we

13

had to submit a separate piece of paper or change

14

another paragraph in the instruction request is that

15

none of them dealt with a situation where you have

16

separately numbered requests —

17

JUSTICE BREYER:

Well, I mean —

please, I

18

—

19

and that's because I have looked up in some of those

20

cases, and then I sort of looked at the —

21

—

22

a little hard to say.

23

of this appendix and looked at what your instructions

24

looked like.

25

I don't want to appear skeptical, but I am.

And —

which doesn't

most of them don't give you the instructions, so it's

And —

But then I looked on page 32(a)

and if I were sitting there as a
15
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1

judge, I would think, well, gee, that looks like a

2

single thing there.

3

have a (1) and a (2), and it just looks like itfs one

4

ball of wax.

5

for just doing what I said?

6

They have it indented, and they

So can I really fault this Oregon court

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, I —

I think so, because

7

the pattern instruction here told both parties to

8

include all their paragraphs pertaining to punitive

9

damages in one numbered instruction, 34.

10
11

JUSTICE BREYER:

Well, they had some other

handbook that says beware of that.

12

MR. SHAPIRO:

Yes.

13

JUSTICE BREYER:

Because you are going to

14

run into this rule that says if there is any part of a

15

single instruction that is wrong, goodbye, even if the

16

trial judge never mentioned it.

17

MR. SHAPIRO:

But that handbook came out in

18

2006.

And after all, that was a practice tip.

19

not a State court ruling saying you had to organize your

20

instruction this way.

21

It was

We had separate paragraphs, separately

22

numbered.

They dealt with different issues.

23

the Constitution and the other was the State statute.

24

And there's no Oregon case that said that in that

25

situation you have to break it out into a separate piece
16
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of p a p e r .

2

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

I thought the notion was

3

one issue, one charge.

4

practice manual.

5

that the charge should be limited to one issue, one

6

point of law.

7

And it wasn't in just one

There were a few cited in the brief

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, the pattern instructions

8

told us to put every point pertaining to punitive

9

damages in Instruction No. 34.

Both sides did that.

10

And the Court was working with plaintiff's instruction,

11

taking their

12

—
JUSTICE BREYER:

I mean, it would be pretty

13

odd.

Did the person who wrote that read these 28 cases

14

or some share thereof?

15

—

16

just, if you have one instruction, copy the —

17

instruction?

18

parts.

it wasn't you, I know -- why -- why wouldn't you

19

MR. SHAPIRO:
pattern —

21

due process point.

22

Well, you see, the —

the

the pattern instruction didn't include the

JUSTICE BREYER:

True, but you could add

that to the pattern.

24
25

the model

Then you won't make errors in the other

20

23

And if you were going to do that

MR. SHAPIRO:
and the —

That's what we tried to do,

the judge invited us while dealing with the

17
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1

other side's instruction to go through this one by one.

2

She —

3

addition?

she was asking us:

4

And we —

Now, what's your next

we got to the due process point,

5

and she said:

What is your authority?

6

and she said:

I don't think that instruction is

7

necessary.

8
9

It was separately argued.

And we told her,

It was separately

decided by the State courts in the prior decisions,

10

decided by this Court as -- as a separate matter, and

11

that is exactly how the trial court approached this.

12

Her request was to go through this item by item.

13

She wasn't taking an all-or-nothing approach

14

to this instruction.

15

document and asked what from our menu of additions

16

was necessary.

17

She started with plaintiff's

JUSTICE BREYER:

I'm not speaking of this

18

from the point of view -- I mean I -- when I read that

19

petition for cert, I thought this is a run- around, and

20

I'm not sure that I think that now.

21

is because I put myself in the position of not the trial

22

judge.

23

the Oregon Supreme Court justice.

And what he is doing

24

is he's reading that instruction.

And —

25

you say in response to what —

That is, the reason

The person to put yourself in the position of is

and what can

what he might have

18
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1

thought?

2

He knows this rule.

The rule is if the

3

instruction is -- is unfavorable in any part, if itfs

4

wrong, you are out.

5

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well —

6

JUSTICE BREYER:

He knows that rule, because

7

there have been a lot of cases on it.

8

your instruction, and as I looked carefully —

9

know this the first time when it was here, but he said

10

because it's right in paragraph 1 —

11

in paragraph 1, where he was wrong —

12

to the rest of it.

13

MR. SHAPIRO: Yes.

14

JUSTICE BREYER:

15

says:

And then he reads
I didn't

I mean it's wrong
I don't have to go

Now we send it back, so he

Okay, now I've got to go to the rest of it.

16

MR. SHAPIRO:

You know, Justice Breyer, this

17

is very similar to what was at issue in the Flowers case

18

which reached this Court.

19

said if you intermix different appeal points in your

20

brief, we are not going to consider any of them if there

21

are any errors to be found in any of the paragraphs in

22

their brief.

23

The Alabama Supreme Court had

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

24

thing about —

25

discussing?

But I thought the whole

this is the NAACP case you that you were

19
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MR. SHAPIRO:

Yes.

2

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

—

that this was

3

something that the Alabama Supreme Court really sprung

4

at the last minute, that it was not like this rule.

5

There were not 2 8 cases in the Alabama Supreme Court

6

applying the rule.

7

It seemed to be quite a novel rule.

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, what —

what the State

8

argued there was that for 60 years the "correct in all

9

respects" rule was in effect in Alabama, and they cited

10

dozens of cases applying it.

11

held that that approach was pointless severity.

12

though the State supreme court there said, we can't

13

disentangle these arguments, it's too complicated, it's

14

too much of a burden on the State supreme court, this

15

Court unanimously found that was pointless severity.

16

And at that point --

17

JUSTICE STEVENS:

But this Court unanimously
Even

There was a basis for

18

questioning the good faith of the court in that case, I

19

think.

20

MR. SHAPIRO:

21

JUSTICE STEVENS:

22
23

Well

—

And I don't think that's

true here.
MR. SHAPIRO:

I —

I —

we don't question

24

the good faith of the court, but we say that this is

25

pointless severity, a rule that this Court has applied
20
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1

more recently in Lee v. Kemna where there was no issue

2

of bad faith.

3

severe and unnecessarily severe to insist on a perfect

4

proposal in that case.

5

The Court thought that it was pointlessly

JUSTICE BREYER:

The best you have come up

6

with —

7

thoroughly —

8

a case where they didn't apply the rule is that George

9

case, right?

10

and I think you have researched this pretty
and the best you have come up with to find

"George," I think, is the name of it.

And there, there is an alternative ground

11

which is that the judge had to —

12

instruction himself, and it's a criminal case.

13

Shepardized it and it has only been cited twice.

14

and so I'm slightly at sea, to tell you the truth.

15

—

16

decide whether that State ground is adequate as a matter

17

of Federal law or not?

18

had to give the
And we
And —
And

and what is the standard I'm supposed to use to

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, there is an earlier case

19

that is interesting, State v. Brown, which comes several

20

years before, and it's cited in our brief.

21

an imperfect instructional request was made, and the

22

Court still found that there was a duty to give the

23

instruction based on due process.

24

that the parties during the charge conference had

25

debated the issue.

In that case

And the reason was

It was a fair-enough exposition for
21
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1

the trial court to understand the need for the charge.

2

And here this really is much like the

3

Osborne case.

4

defendant didn't make any instructional proposal, and

5

this Court still reversed and required a new trial with

6

the correct instruction.

7

that.

8

sufficiently brought this to the attention of the trial

9

judge for Federal adequacy purposes even though no

10

You know, in the Osborne case the

It said due process required

And the Court said that we -- that the party had

instruction was -- was proposed.

11

The lawyer there merely moved to dismiss the

12

proceeding, never proposed an instruction, but this

13

Court required a retrial with a correct set of

14

instructions to the jury.

15

think; and also the Flowers case, I believe, is a

16

fortiori.

17

State interest there in having the lawyers break their

18

arguments up into separate headings and subheadings so

19

the appellate court could follow the argument.

20

That's an a fortiori case, I

There really was a strong and compelling

But here there wasn't any burden placed on

21

the trial judge at all by our request.

She was going

22

through these one by one, and she asked us:

23

next point that you want added?

24

on a silver platter.

25

could have simply read it to* the jury in that form.

What's your

We proposed it.

It was

She didn't have to retype it.

22
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1

didn't have to be edited or amended.

There literally

2

was no burden on the trial judge at all.

3

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

And so we --

She didn't get to the —

4

the other grounds, because I think it was all about that

5

paragraph and whether that paragraph was adequate under

6

our then precedent.

7

—

8

are now before us were —

9

MR. SHAPIRO:

And I don't think that —

that the

the incorrect portions of the charge that have now -were even reached then.
She did look at the illicit

10

profits point.

11

that; that's unnecessary.

12

the "may versus shall" issue because she was working

13

with plaintiffs' proposal.

14

had before her our request for this due process

15

instruction.

16

before her.

17

And she said:

I'm not going to give

She did —

So all —

she didn't address

really she just

She analyzed it separately, it was debated

And this is much more specific than what the

18

lawyers did in the Osborne case.

19

propose an instruction.

20

platter.

21

no work for the trial judge at all because she was

22

simply telling the lawyers, make this change, make that

23

change that we've discussed, so there is zero burden on

24

the court.

25

They didn't even

We served it up on a silver

She could have used it, and indeed there was

And you have to ask in this situation, what
23
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1

is the legitimate State interest that would support this

2

massive forfeiture of a very important due process

3

right?

4

that it promotes affirmance of jury verdicts whether or

5

not there has been a due process violation.

6

about that.

7

The plaintiff says the State interest here is

But think

That's hardly a State interest.
JUSTICE BREYER:

The State interest in the

8

rule in general, I take it, is to require the lawyers,

9

if they are going to object to the instructions that the

10

judge is going to give, to produce an instruction that

11

is a correct instruction of the law.

12

why, I guess, they have this rule.

13

MR. SHAPIRO:

14

JUSTICE BREYER:

That's —

that's

Oh, yes.
And —

and you'd better get

15

it right, because if you don't get it right, you're

16

going to lose your ability to claim that the judge was

17

wrong in refusing to give any part of it.

18

Now, if that's the reason they have that

19

rule, that would seem to apply as much in this case as

20

in any other case.

21

Why wouldn't it?

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, please recall that in

22

both Osborne and in the Lee case, there was a general

23

State purpose of that kind that supported the rule, but

24

the Court said it was an exorbitant or unnecessarily

25

severe application of the rule.

And that's what we

24
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1

contend here, that this is exorbitant, it serves no

2

legitimate purpose.

3

just nullifies the defendant's due process rights,

4

It is truly a game of gotcha that

And that precedent I think would be of great

5

concern in various fields of law.

6

that will apply in civil rights cases in the future,

7

criminal cases, all sorts of cases.

8
9

So I —

This is a rule of law

I think if this Court does apply its

own criteria here, it will see that this is an exercise

10

in futility, it was an ambush as a practical matter.

11

didn't have any reason to think we had to submit this

12

again on a separate piece of paper.

13

JUSTICE STEVENS:

14

well, why was it an exercise in futility?

15

don't quite understand.

16

MR. SHAPIRO:

Could you just tell me,
That's what I

Oh, because the judge had

17

ruled as a matter of substantive law that she wasn't

18

going to give this instruction.

19

we separated it.

20

JUSTICE STEVENS:

21

it was already covered.

22

page you pointed me to.

23

MR. SHAPIRO:

We

It wouldn't matter if

But she said she thought

That's what I —

Well, she —

on that very

she said that was

24

all she was going to say about the point.

25

well, that doesn't cover our point, because we want
25
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1

protection against punishment for harm to non-parties.

2

And she said:

3

deny the rest of your request, No. 34.

4

I'm not going to give that instruction; I

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

And where is this

5

colloquy?

I mean, we went through the parts, she said I

6

think it's covered and it was okay.

7

saying more than ws included in that colloquy.

8
9
10

MR. SHAPIRO:

I think if —

if

you look at the whole colloquy, that's the gist of it.
I -- I have paraphrased it, but --

11
12

Well, I —

You seem to be

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

You've made it much

clearer than it was.

13

MR. SHAPIRO:

14

(Laughter.)

15

MR. SHAPIRO:

Perhaps

—

—

perhaps I did.

But I -- I

16

would just point out that in Osborne the lawyer didn't

17

make it clear at all.

18

instruction.

19

The lawyer didn't even propose an

We proposed a good instruction that this

20

Court has quoted from emphasizing our language,

21

saying -- saying it correctly captures the due process

22

principle.

23

criteria of -- of adequacy, and that is sufficient to

24

preserve the point.

25

preserved for appellate purposes in Oregon.

So that is enough to satisfy Federal

There is no dispute that this is

26
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1
2

Unless the Court has further questions, I
I would reserve the balance of our time.

3
4
5

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

Thank you, Mr.

Shapiro.
Mr. Peck.

6

ORAL ARGUMENT OF ROBERT S. PECK

7

ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

8
9
10

—

MR. PECK:

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it

please the Court:
This Court's constitutional mandate in this

11

case is conditioned in several significant respects, and

12

it invites the discretion and judgment of a State court

13

that's applying it.

14

have flexibility in coming up with a procedure to

15

address this procedural due process issue.

16

First of all, it says that States

It also says that it has to be an

17

appropriate case; there has to be a significant risk of

18

juror confusion, and a request.

19

in the opinion that this Court intended to federalize

20

the State procedure over how that request occurs.

21

There's no indication

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

You don't dispute

22

that it's a Federal question whether that procedure is

23

adequate and independent?

24
25

MR. PECK:

I do not, but I also submit that

it is more than adequate.

Exist —

27
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1

Supreme Court decided was that the existing procedure

2

permitting a limiting instruction to be requested —

3

Oregon it's Rule 105, same language as in the Federal

4

rule —

5

be specific, it has to be on the record.

6

precedent says that when we mean specific, the proponent

7

has to give us the exact language —

8

party presentation principle —

9

they are asking us to use.

in

and such a request has to be timely, it has to

10

And Oregon

this is part of the

the exact language that

And that means that we also apply our

11

traditional 92-year-old rule that requests for

12

instruction must be clear and correct in all respects.

13

JUSTICE STEVENS:

14

JUSTICE BREYER:

The problem

—

I would say the 28 cases

15

are not quite as clear as I suggested.

16

couldn't find in those 28 cases really a comparable

17

situation.

18

MR. PECK:

19

JUSTICE BREYER:

That is, I

Well -In each instance it seemed

20

as if one of two things was the case:

21

the instruction was in error, it really was the matter

22

brought up in the first place, or the court said, but he

23

gave the essence of the instruction he wanted anyway.

24
25

Either, A, where

Now, which of those cases do you think —

I

am leading up to, what of -- what of those cases do you

28
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1

think is your best support, because I couldn't —

2

are not perfect.

they

3

MR. PECK:

I would look first at

4

Reyes-Camarena, which is a 2000 —

5

involving the death penalty.

6

parts of this request, in a single request.

7

asked for a mitigating factors instruction, which the

8

court found was correct on the law and -- and would have

9

been given had it been asked for separately.

a 2000 decision

And there, there were two
The request

10

But it also asked the jury to consider

11

sympathy for the defendant, which they found to be

12

contrary to Oregon law, and therefore, it was not error

13

for the trial court to have refused this.

14

JUSTICE BREYER:

What -- what you can't tell

15

from that is what was the part of the sympathy

16

instruction that they thought was wrong, and was the

17

part that they thought was wrong really part and parcel

18

of the part that the —

19

complaining about.

20

MR. PECK:

that the appellant was

Well, the court, though, did cite

21

a prior decision that talked about a sympathy

22

instruction and claimed that this one was no different

23

than that.

24

It makes clear, the opinion does, on that.

25

It was contained in a single instruction.

Owings v. Rose is that another case which

29
Alderson Reporting Company

Official - Subject to Final Review

1

both parties have cited.

And in Owings, it's very

2

clear.

3

instruction that are offered at the same time, and --

4

and one part is right.

5

third party liability.

There you have two different parts of an

6

And this -- this one deals with

JUSTICE BREYER:

But I remember that,

7

because they said on that one -- some floor covering

8

thing, wasn't it, that they had some liability for bad

9

floors or designing the floors wrong

10

MR. PECK:

If

11

JUSTICE BREYER:

—

—
If that's the case, what

12

they said was:

13

he did give you the instruction that you wanted, though

14

in a different way --

15

MR. PECK:

16

JUSTICE BREYER:

17

Don't worry about it because basically

But

—
—

and besides that, they

added --

18

MR. PECK:

And besides that

19

JUSTICE BREYER:

20

MR. PECK:

21

Then in Hotelling v. Walther, a 1944 case,

22

the proposed instruction consist -- consisted of three

23

separate sentences, and the Court does reprint that

24

instruction.

25

different legal proposition in it.

—

—

You're right.

this was an alternate ground.

And each of those sentences has a

30
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1

last sentence, the third proposition, that the Court

2

found to be in error, and therefore, found that there

3

was no error in failing to give this instruction because

4

it was not clear and correct in all respects.

5

I —

I think that that —

6

JUSTICE BREYER:

In the last one, what I

7

have here is that the court said the so-called requested

8

instruction was never requested at all —

9

MR. PECK:

But —

10

JUSTICE BREYER:

11

MR. PECK:

12

—

at all.

But I do not believe that that

was the —

13

JUSTICE BREYER:

What is the —

14

—

15

standard?

16

said at the end is correct.

17

death case and we have said as a matter of Federal law

18

that this execution is unconstitutional, and then we

19

send it back.

20

there are a couple of matters of State law here that bar

21

the Federal consideration of the death question.

22

here they are.

23

I will go look at that again.

what is the

But what is the

I mean, remember, I think what your brother
Imagine that yours is a

And the court then says:

Oh, we forgot;

And

And then they come up with just this.

Is this —

is this a situation where you

24

would be equally —

that's my problem.

25

yourself in my shoes and —

And so, put

and tell me what you would
31
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1

do if this is the death case and not the case that you

2

have?

3

MR. PECK:

Well, you know, it's —

it's hard

4

to get my arms around your hypothetical, because I don't

5

know the grounds on which --

6

JUSTICE BREYER:

I'm just imagining that

7

what has happened is that the instruction that they have

8

given for the defendant in the death case violates

9

Federal law, and then we send it back, and what happens

10

is that the State court says, oh, it may violate Federal

11

law all right, but it's -- the Federal court is blocked

12

from considering it because there are these two other

13

State grounds that mean that the lawyer

14

MR. PECK:
•

15
16

I understand.

JUSTICE BREYER:
MR. PECK:

—

But —

Okay.
but the question would be

17

then, why would that be a situation like this, where the

18

trial judge —

19

Justice Ginsburg —

20

were other parts of the instructions offered by Philip

21

Morris that were incorrect on the law, and the illicit

22

profits was one of them.

23

contrary to your assumption,
the trial judge did find that there

JUSTICE SCALIA:

24

just stop there?

25

State

Why didn't the trial judge

I mean, if this is the ruling in the

—
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1

MR. PECK:

Justice

2

JUSTICE SCALIA:

—

—

once the trial judge

3

found that one of the other instructions was bad, he

4

could have just said, I throw the whole thing out.

5

did he go to all the trouble of going into this, the

6

governing one?

7

MR. PECK:

This is —

Why

this is a process.

8

Counsel in the case in a trial in Oregon can offer

9

instructions every -- a proffered instruction up to the

10

point when the jury is instructed under their law.

11

Philip Morris had the opportunity to correct it.

12

practical nature of a charge conference is that the

13

parties come in with their proposed instructions.

14

plaintiffs followed the pattern instruction, which by

15

the way does not require enumeration.

16

JUSTICE SCALIA:

You —

So

The

The

you are

17

acknowledging that the trial court did not apply the

18

rule

—

19
20
21

MR. PECK:
procedure.

The —

it's not a rule of trial

It's a rule of appellate review.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

Well, I — yes,

22

that's exactly right.

And I think the purpose for the

23

rule is to avoid confusion about the ground of decision

24

for the trial court.

25

she says the instruction's no good, on appellate review

If you have got two errors, and
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1

you don't know which basis was at issue.

2

doubt here the basis on which the trial court was

3

ruling, is there?

4

MR. PECK:

There is no

I believe there is —

there —

5

first of all the trial judge rejected this instruction

6

on multiple grounds, and made it clear that the illicit

7

profits request was contrary to the Oregon statute that

8

sets up the criteria.

9

and contradictory.

10

She found other parts confusing

But —

and -- but there are two

things that I think are significant here.

11

You have to look at what was discussed

12

here.

13

appendix:

14

plaintiffs1 harms.

15

here to punish at all, for the conduct that caused harm

16

to Jesse Williams on or after September 1, 1988."

17

sounds very much like an acceptance of the rule that

18

Philip Morris was advocating.

19

The trial judge, if you turn to 21a of the joint
"We are not here to punish for other
We are here to punish, if we are

On 19a she says:

This

"These punitive damages

20

are not designed to compensate for other plaintiffs who

21

are not here. " On 20a there is a colloquy; she

22

expresses her belief that the risk is adequately guarded

23

against, suggests language to express that, and asks:

24

"Does that get you where you need to be?"

25

That's when Philip Morris's counsel says
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"Okay."

She had every reason to believe that she had

2

satisfied it.

3

She then follows up.

JUSTICE STEVENS:

Do we give any weight in

4

the case to the fact that the instruction that the

5

Petitioners now request and the rule had not really been

6

announced clearly as of the time of this trial?

7

not exactly a new rule, but let's —

8

will call it a new rule.

9

MR. PECK:

It's

for our sake we

Does that have any weight?

I don't think it does.

10

JUSTICE STEVENS:

11

and prejudice jurisprudence.

12

civil action

But it does in our cause
In habeas, which is also a

—

13

MR. PECK:

I understand.

14

JUSTICE STEVENS:

-- we say there is an

15

overarching Federal principle that allows; because of

16

cause and prejudice, we can consider the Federal issue.

17

We do that all the time.

18

the Petitioner, but it seems to me they're quite

19

relevant here, especially when you consider the

20

importance of the constitutional issue, which was not

21

really —

22

side of the aisle or to the trial judge.

23

let's face it —

MR. PECK:

Those cases weren't raised by

clear to counsel on either

Well, here's the reason why I

24

think in the context of this record, and —

25

litigant, it is not significant.

and this

And that is, if you
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1

look at 21a, the appendix in our —

2

there we have Philip Morris in another smoker trial in

3

Oregon offering up a requested instruction on this

4

issue.

5

Court's decision in this case.

6

our merit brief,

This is in 2002, so it's well before this

It's even before State Farm v. Campbell, and

7

the requested instruction says, one sentence: "You are

8

not to impose punishment for harms suffered by persons

9

other than the plaintiff before you."

10

JUSTICE STEVENS:

But the trial judge didn't

11

have the benefit of -- of the ruling that this Court has

12

subsequently made on that point.

13

fact here said:

14

will give you an instruction; you can't give me a case.

15

And she was right.

16

The trial judge in

Now, if you can give me a case, then I

MR. PECK:

But she —

but that's actually

17

not the same issue that she asked that on.

Counsel

18

cited page 17a of the joint appendix for that question.

19

And if you look at the bottom of 16a, her question:

20

"Let me stop first and go back to the proportionality

21

point you are making. " This is the ratio point, the

22

second guidepost of BMW v. Gore.

23

case law that says the trial court shall, in order to

24

have a constitutional instruction, tell the jury about

25

proportionality?"

She says:

And this is where he says:
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1

addressed post-verdict.

2

law; and she says:

3

not going to go where no judge has gone before, because

4

she did not want to be reversed.

5
6

Is there any case

No, I'm not going to go there.

I'm

So she is trying to be careful, and I think
you have to credit the Oregon --

7
8

She asks:

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

Well, but I —

it sounds

to me like that you are confirming my concerns.

9

MR. PECK:

No.

I —

I think that what she

10

said is as to the proportionality issue.

11

issue, she even returns to it later when Philip Morris

12

bring up a different issue with respect to punitive

13

damages.

14

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

Oh.

On the other

Oh, you're —

you are

15

saying that if our law had been clear at the time, that

16

she still wouldn't have given the instruction?

17

MR. PECK:

No.

I'm saying that she thought

18

she was complying with that.

19

that:

20

harms.

21

She stated on the record

We are not here to punish for other plaintiffs'
Later on that other issue, if you look at 28a —
JUSTICE KENNEDY:

So your —

your contention

22

is, is that this trial court and the counsel in the case

23

had all the guidance necessary to give the correct

24

instruction —

25

MR. PECK:

She —
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1
2
3

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

—

before —

before we

even announced the rule?
MR. PECK:

She seemed to accept —

she

4

accepted the point before you announced the rule, and

5

the Oregon Court of Appeals ruling in the Estate of

6

Schwarz case where they offered that one-sentence

7

instruction, reversed the verdict, in part because that

8

instruction they said should have been given.

9

anticipated this Court's rule.

10

So they

I think --

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

To move —

to move

11

from the trial court to the appellate court, if you are

12

correct that there is this routine, clear rule of State

13

procedure, why would the appellate court say, in its

14

head, well, I could rely on that, but I want to decide

15

this complicated, difficult rule of Federal

16

constitutional law instead?

17

MR. PECK:

Well, in fact, the —

the court

18

thought it was relying on it.

19

iterations in the Oregon Court of Appeals and in the

20

Oregon Supreme Court, they cited this rule, "clear and

21

correct in all respects," in order to reject the "harm

22

to others" instruction because they said it was

23

inconsistent with State law.

24
25

In each of the previous

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

So you think we just

made a mistake in going ahead and reaching the Federal
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1

procedural rule that we reached because it was barred by

2

this adequate and independent State ground that the

3

Oregon courts had relied upon?

4

MR. PECK:

No.

What I'm saying is that they

5

went further then, and this is what gave this Court the

6

authority to rule on that substantive issue.

7

that that request was inconsistent with the Oregon

8

statute.

9

petition, where they say:

And they did so —

They said

on page 48a of the
"In Williams 1, the Court of

10

Appeals concluded that the instruction was incorrect

11

under State law.

We agree."

12

And then again on page 52a, they note that:

13

"That is not correct as an independent matter of Oregon

14

law respecting the conduct of juri trials and

15

instructions" —

16
17

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:
your —

18

MR. PECK:

19

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

20

But then I think

answer —

But —
But I think your

go ahead with your but.

21

(Laughter.)

22

MR. PECK:

But then they went on to say:

23

"And nothing in due process requires us to look at this

24

differently."

25

was the constitutional mistake that the Oregon court

That's where they made their error.
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1

made.

2

They thought there was no Federal issue addressing that,

3

and so they decided that they didn't have to reach any

4

other State law issues.

5

preserved objections that Mrs. Williams made to the

6

other parts of this unified instruction on punitive

7

damages.

8
9

They thought they were wrong on a State ground.

And they ignored the well

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:
still don't see that answer.

Well, I'm sorry.

I

You are saying they said

10

yes, there was this rule of Oregon law, but you can

11

still reach —

12

process issue, so we just can't rely on that.

13

that's true, then that seems to me to be a concession

14

that this is not an adequate and independent State

15

ground that would bar consideration of a Federal

16

constitutional issue.

17

MR. PECK:

there might still be a Federal due
And if

What was not an adequate on

18

independent State grounds was their decision that the

19

Oregon statute which permits you to punish a misconduct

20

in order to deter others from doing that allowed

21

punishment for harm to non-parties.

22

That part was their interpretation of the

23

statute, and if there were no due process equation here,

24

that would have been an independent State ground.

25

was wrong as a matter of due process.
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1

But there are other grounds, other mistakes,

2

substantive mistakes, avoiding law in this instruction.

3

And any trial court that gave instruction number 34,

4

which was objected to as a whole, would have committed

5

reversible error because they failed to follow the

6

Oregon statute.

7

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

I guess I think it's

8

the more routine practice for a court, if you have a --

9

again, as you argue -- a clear procedural rule that bars

10

addressing the substantive issue, to go ahead and rely

11

on that.

12

of uncertain application, maybe you go ahead and say,

13

well, we we're going to decide on the merits anyway.

14

Now, if the procedural rule is difficult and

But it seems to me, under your presentation,

15

it's the other way around.

16

procedural rule, difficult Federal and State intertwined

17

constitutional rule, and yet the court says, well, I'm

18

going to do the hard work rather than the easy work.

19

MR. PECK:

It's a clear and easy

I think it was natural for the

20

court to do that.

That was the issue presented to them

21

by Philip Morris.

And courts do not reach out to do

22

other issues.

23

of Philip Morris, and they were addressing the arguments

24

that Philip Morris made.

25

that inured to Mrs. Williams benefit, not to Philip

They reach —

they were being solicitous

And when they decided that
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1

Morris's benefit, then they said we don't need to

2

address your other questions.

3

look at the Oregon Supreme Court noting in their own

4

decision that there was no futility here.

5

last time we were here Philip Morris said the reason

6

they needed this instruction was because of what was

7

said at closing argument.

8
9

JUSTICE BREYER:

And I think have you to

In fact, the

What are the elements?

Imagine -- I'm trying to get help, if I were to try to

10

put pen to paper on this.

11

Then we will be back at the State law issue that I

12

thought was going to be there, which was the issue of --

13

you are talking about the colloquy.

14

essence of the Federal mandated instruction, or didn't

15

they?

16

cetera.

17

Suppose they win in this.

Did they give the

And then look how cooperative the judge was, et
But that isn't before us now.
What is before us now is something that

18

blocks our consideration of that or anybody's

19

consideration of that.

20

case; imagine it is the most, you know, striking case,

21

that's why I used a death example, and we go through

22

exactly the same thing.

23

the same thing, the State court, that happened here.

24

And now what are the words that distinguish whether the

25

court is in essence, to be colloquial, giving everybody

And imagine this is not your

And then the court does exactly
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1

the runaround or whether the court is applying a —

2

absolute, clear, you know, fair, standard of State law?

3

Which really they should have gone into first and saved

4

everybody a lot of trouble.

5
6

MR. PECK:

I think the easiest way to look

at this --

7

JUSTICE BREYER:

8

MR. PECK:

9

an

—

Yes.

is imagine that the statute of

limitations, which now bars any such suit in Oregon,

10

were brought today, after this Court's decision in

11

Williams, and imagine that Philip Morris is the

12

defendant, and at the end of the trial they offer their

13

number 34 as it was before saying, "This Court said that

14

they had made the right choice in asking for this

15

instruction."

16

A trial court clearly would engage in

17

reversible error if they gave that instruction because

18

it materially departs from Oregon law.

19

time, they could deny that instruction.

20

that instruction, and the Oregon Supreme Court would not

21

violate the mandate of this Court's decision by saying

22

that that is a correct decision on the part of the trial

23

law court because it was not clear and correct in all

24

respects.

25

At the same
They could deny

And that is part of what distinguishes this.
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1

This is still a rule that has to apply to its

2

instruction

3

—
JUSTICE BREYER:

Well, what they say is —

4

look at the two errors they found.

One is in saying

5

"may" instead of "shall," and the other is in saying

6

"illicit profit" instead of "profit."

7

pretty picky.

8

not only are they being picky, but they are being picky

9

after the event.

And they are

So, this is very picky, they say.

And

And they could have raised it first,

10

and they have 28 cases supporting them, but none of

11

these cases is right on point because the subject matter

12

is, you know, closer bound up.

13

together and say itfs an unreasonable application of a

14

rule that was there.

15

MR. PECK:

And so they put all this

And you say -I would urge you, Justice Breyer,

16

to look at the original case in 1916, the Sorenson case.

17

There the court was face with a question:

18

the kernel of a correct instruction in there, is that

19

adequate to ask the court to give that instruction or

20

should we insist on what they thought at the time was

21

the majority rule in the United States, that we should

22

insist on an instruction that is clear and correct in

23

all respects, and that the —

24

responsibility to provide that?

25

with the clear and correct rule.

If there is

that the counsel has the
And they decided to go
That was the debate
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1

that they had, and that debate informs this one.

2
3

JUSTICE BREYER:

Sorenson was the agent and

the principal, the broker who was selling some land.

4

MR. PECK:

Right.

5

JUSTICE BREYER:

And I think in that case

6

they also said, "By the way, you've got basically the

7

instruction that you wanted, and you overlooked" — no,

8

that was the case where they said, "You overlooked in

9

your instruction an important allegation of fact," which

10

allegation was that the guy had been rehired as a

11

broker.

12

MR. PECK:

And there's a similar distinction

13

that makes Osborne irrelevant, which counsel suggested

14

was a —

15

an exemplary here.
In Osborne, an element of the crime had not

16

been instructed upon.

17

be the offer of an instruction.

18

presentation principle puts the onus on counsel to do

19

so, and Philip Morris showed, in 2002, well before this

20

Court's decisions that they know how to do it when they

21

want to.

22

That's why there didn't have to

JUSTICE SCALIA:

But the party

Mr. Peck, are you —

are

23

you asserting that our remand order was in error?

24

all, it did say, "We remand this case so that the Oregon

25

Supreme Court can apply this standard we have set
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1

forth."

2
3

MR. PECK:

JUSTICE BREYER:
error.

6

We didn't say it was in

I mean, there is nothing wrong with that.
(Laughter.)

7

MR. PECK:

8

JUSTICE SCALIA:

9

I'd contend, Your Honor,

that the --

4
5

And I —

Well, I think

—

If you say it's in error,

my next question is going to be --

10

MR. PECK:

11

read that decision --

12

I think the Oregon Supreme Court

JUSTICE SCALIA:

—

can —

is it up to a

13

State court to sit in judgment about whether our remand

14

orders are in error or not?

15

MR. PECK:

Well, I'm prepared to say that

16

the Oregon Supreme Court took that remand order to mean

17

that they had to have in place —

18

due process decision —

19

procedure that was fair, outcome neutral, applied

20

that they had to have a

JUSTICE SCALIA:

to mean, they were just wrong.

22

it says.

23

MR. PECK:

24

JUSTICE SCALIA:

—

If that's what they took it

21

25

this was a procedural

I mean, that's not what

Well, if you look

—

The opinion concludes, "As

the preceding discussion makes clear, we believe the
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1

Oregon Supreme Court applied the wrong constitutional

2

standard when considering Philip Morris's appeal."

3

it goes to the constitutional issue we are talking

4

about.

5

MR. PECK:

When considering

6

JUSTICE SCALIA:

And

—

"We remand so that the

7

Oregon Supreme Court can apply the standard we have set

8

forth," which has nothing to do with the issue we have

9

been discussing this morning.

10

MR. PECK:

Your Honor

11

JUSTICE SCALIA:

12

MR. PECK:

—

So it was wrong?

No, it was not wrong.

I don't

13

think it was wrong, and here's the reason I don't think

14

it was wrong:

15

when that thought that due process does not inform the

16

analysis on harm to non-parties.

17

substantive error, and that part is what they got wrong.

18

Much of this opinion said that they got lots

You corrected the Oregon Supreme Court

You corrected that

19

of other things right.

20

said, "Okay, we got that issue wrong, but there are

21

other problems with this instruction that are adequate

22

and independent grounds for --

23

And so Oregon looked at it and

JUSTICE SCALIA:

That's very nice, but

24

that's not what we remanded for.

25

MR. PECK:

You did not remand for that, but
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1

when this Court decides a constitutional issue of one

2

part, it doesn't necessarily tell the court anything

3

different.

4

is that where there's a significant risk of jury

5

confusion, the State has to provide a procedure and has

6

flexibility in providing that procedure.

7

indication that the procedure for limiting instructions

8

does not satisfy that.

9

What —

the essence of this Court's opinion

JUSTICE SOUTER:

There is no

The problem that I think we

10

all have is how do we guard, in effect, guard against

11

making constitutional decisions which are simply going

12

to be nullified by some clever device raising a

13

procedural issue or an issue of State law when the case

14

goes back?

15

in effect, a bad faith response to our decision except

16

by purporting to require the State courts to follow a

17

certain order of battle in the decision of issues before

18

them so that when the case gets to us, we can be assured

19

that there is no lurking issue that has not yet been

20

decided as a matter of State law that in effect could

21

then be resurrected to nullify our decision?

22

any way to guard against that except by telling the

23

State courts what the sequence is in which they have to

24

make decisions?

25

Is there any way for us to ensure against,

MR. PECK:

I believe there is.
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1

believe that it would be error to suggest to the State

2

supreme court that they must, even though prudent,

3

follow a specific sequence, simply because that would

4

mean that they would have to necessarily decide every

5

State law issue in the case

6

JUSTICE SOUTER:

—
I —

I see the problem.

7

mean, that's why I raised the question, how can we

8

ensure

—

9

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

But we do that all the

10

time in cause and prejudice cases.

11

time --

We do it all the

12

MR. PECK:

13

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

14

importance of the constitutional right.

15

Yes.

MR. PECK:

—

because of the

I understand that, but I think

16

the adequate and independent State law ground provides

17

all the protection.

18

so, that State supreme courts will operate in good

19

faith.

20

U.S. Supreme Court, were —

21

still trusted to apply the decision.

You assume, and I think properly

Even in Flowers, after the fourth trip to the

22

Alabama Supreme Court was

JUSTICE SOUTER:

23

is there is —

24

except

25

I

Okay.

Your —

your answer

there is no way to guard against it

—
MR. PECK:

Except

—
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1

JUSTICE SOUTER:

2

faith of what the court does on remand.

3

MR. PECK:

—

by reviewing the good

Well, by -- by accepting that if

4

the rule that has been imposed was invoked properly by

5

the party that invoked it at the right time

6

JUSTICE SOUTER:

7

MR. PECK:

—

—

Yes.

that it IS firmly established

8

and regularly followed, then it should satisfy the

9

Court

—

10

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

But it serves very little

11

interest.

12

nothing the plaintiff's counsel has done below, nothing

13

that the intermediate clause would have done, would have

14

-- would have been different if they had submitted what

15

they call the "correct in all respects" rule.

16

Nothing the trial judge would have done,

If they had filed the "correct in all

17

respects" rule and submitted that rule -- if she had

18

said, judge, I want to type a little piece of paper,

19

everything would have been the same.

20

MR. PECK:

I suggest that it would be

21

different.

22

when they decided that there was no futility in offering

23

another one, that it would be different.

24

of the matter is that

25

I think the Oregon Supreme Court decided,

And the fact

—

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

I excluded the Oregon
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1

Supreme Court from my list of —

2

would have done something differently.

3

MR. PECK:

But —

of participants who

but —

but the fact of the

4

matter is, if after closing arguments which was the

5

trigger that Philip Morris urged upon this Court for

6

needing this substantive rule, if after —

7

Philip Morris's counsel had returned to the judge —

8

know, they said a few things that we think would tell

9

the jury to punish for harm to others.

if after that
you

We don't think

10

the instruction is adequate.

11

instruction, that one-sentence instruction like we gave

12

in Fink v. Schwarz.

13

given that instruction.

14

We will give you the same

I believe the court would have

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

There is, of course,

15

another way to protect our constitutional authority in

16

this case.

17

addressing the substantive due-process challenge to

18

a punitive damages award.

19

presented here.

20

We are talking about procedures for

That is the second question

If we went and granted that question and

21

considered that issue, we would have protected our

22

authority to reach that question despite the procedural

23

objections alone.

24
25

Why don't we just do that?

MR. PECK:

Well, Your Honor, of course, the

last time we were here you had a full briefing and even
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1

some argument on that.

2

prepared to stand on that briefing and argument.

3

And I —

1 believe that we are

We do not believe the Due Process Clause is

4

an exercise in elementary school mathematics.

5

not tell you something about this.

6

look at the enormity of the misconduct.

7
8

It does

Here you have to

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

And that did --

I'm not asking you

to argue here today the second question presented.

9

MR. PECK:

10

I understand.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

But if we have some

11

concern, if there is something malodorous about the fact

12

that the Oregon Supreme Court waited until the last

13

minute to come up with this rule that was before it all

14

the time, which was a State court rule that you would

15

expect the State court to be addressing as a matter of

16

course, then —

17

address what we do in a situation, having to

18

characterize the nature of that -- that consideration,

19

simply by saying:

20

the questions presented.

21

and to avoid having to reach that, we will go ahead and

22

do it.

23

then we -- we can avoid having to

Look, we are going to go ahead with

MR. PECK:

We can decide it in this case;

Well, it's —

itfs certainly

24

within this Court's power to do that.

25

made a very harsh accusation in this case of bad faith
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1

on the part of the Oregon Supreme Court.

2

sandbagging here.

3

way.

There was no

The Oregon court did not act in that

4

Mrs. Williams raised the State-law issues at

5

every opportunity, which is something that Philip Morris

6

denied in their petition but then conceded in their

7

merit brief.

8

Court of Appeals.

9

Court, and we even raised it before this court.

10

And the fact is it was before the Oregon
It was before the Oregon Supreme

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

You —

in answer to the

11

Chief Justice, you are not suggesting that we should go

12

ahead and decide the second question when there has been

13

no briefing on it?

14

MR. PECK:

I am not suggesting that you

15

decide the question, but I recognize the Court has the

16

power to do so.

17

First Amendment case and came out as a Fourth Amendment

18

case.

19

Mapp v. Ohio came to this Court as a

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

I —

I thought

—

20

Mr. Peck, I thought you just told me that there has been

21

full and adequate briefing on that question.

22

MR. PECK:

I believe we had full and

23

adequate briefing.

We may not have had an opportunity

24

to fully argue the case, and itfs up for you to decide

25

whether or not you —

you have enough on that.
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1

I t h a n k you.

2

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

3

Mr. Shapiro, you have three minutes remaining.

Thank you, counsel.

4

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO

5

ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

6

MR. SHAPIRO:

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

7

Justice Breyer asked about these various cases from

8

Oregon, whether they provided guidance and a warning

9

here.

And counsel referred to three cases, Reeve,

10

Owings and then Sorenson.

11

you will see there were simple instructions proposed on

12

a single topic that were infected with an error

13

throughout.

14

If you look at those cases,

And the court said if there is any valid

15

proportion of this instruction, it was covered by

16

something that was said to the jury already.

17

was no harm in not giving that instruction.

18

That is certainly not our case.

So there

We have a

19

separately numbered paragraph dealing with the

20

Constitution, which is guite apart from the statutory

21

factors.

22

Now, counsel referred to the charge actually

23

given by the court as if it provided some protection

24

against punishment for harm to nonparties.

25

that instruction, far from providing the protection that
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1

the —

this Court said was obligatory, it invited global

2

punishment.

3

punitive-damage award up to one hundred million dollars.

4

Lo and behold, they come up with eighty million dollars,

5

right within the suggested range of this charge.

6

there was no --

It told the jury they could return any

7

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

8

charge specifically are you referring to?

9

MR. SHAPIRO:

Which portion of the

This is page 37a of our joint

10

appendix.

11

punitive damages you assess may not exceed the sum of

12

one hundred million dollars.

13

the zone of reasonableness that the jury inferred from

14

this, suggesting a global punishment to the jury with no

15

protection.

16

The —

And

the court concludes the amount of

And that, of course, was

Now this Court said that that protection has

17

to be provided.

18

that the State must give assurance, and it's an

19

important constitutional right, as Justice Kennedy said.

20

I don't think the State court --

21

The Court said the State must insist,

JUSTICE BREYER:

What is your response to

22

the Chief Justice's suggestion that maybe we should

23

reach the issue of due process on the amount?

24
25

MR. SHAPIRO:

We wouldn't oppose that

because this is clearly excessive under what the Court
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1

said in State Farm:

2

compensatory damages, one to one is something of a norm,

3

Where there is substantial

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

I wasn't asking to

4

you argue it, either but I mean I suppose the procedure

5

the parties would prefer, if we were interested in that,

6

would be for us to grant the second question and then

7

have the normal briefing in consideration,

8
9

MR. SHAPIRO:

Oh, that ~

that — yes,

certainly, that -- that -- that is true.

I —

I would

10

comment, too, on Justice Breyer's question about what is

11

the ultimate test here.

12

The Court has stated various criteria and

13

opinions over the last century, but the -- the key ideas

14

are?

15

anticipated?

16

Was it an ambush, something that couldn't be

JUSTICE BREYER:

I mean I will tell you my

17

subjective reaction going through these 38 cases is they

18

are not quite in point, but they really take away the

19

idea of the bad faith, particularly because the first

20

time what the judge said, which I didn't understand its

21

significance then, but the judge said:

22

first part of that paragraph was in —

23

anyway, I don't have to reach the question of whether

24

there were other mistakes under State law in the rest of

25

the instruction.

Well, since the
was in error

They did say that the first time, I
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1

think.

2

MR. SHAPIRO:

Oh, yes, but this is the first

3

time the Court has ever taken this "correct in all

4

respects" rule and extended it to a completely different

5

topic, U.S. constitutional law in a separately numbered

6

paragraph.

7

broken out on a separate piece of paper.

8

would have broken it out on a separate piece of paper.

9

It's just like Lee against Kemna where the Court said —

10

And we had no notice that this had to be

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

If we did, we

What about this point

11

that was made that in 2002 that is exactly what Philip

12

Morris did, give one simple, precise instruction?

13

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, no, that instruction was

14

not harm to nonparties.

15

injuries.

16

lawyers there did break up their instructions

17

differently, but the pattern instruction

18

That was harm for out-of-State

It was a different issue.

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

And it's true the

Is it —

—
is it true that

19

they gave one simple sentence stating their position on

20

—

on what harm to others, how that --

21

MR. SHAPIRO:

22

case did not accept our instruction.

23

accepted the State Farm instruction, which said that

24

there can't be punishment for out-of-State harm.

25

No.

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

That's not true.

But —
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1

instruction stated in a -- in a single paragraph, but

2

all the other requests to charge were broken out?

3

MR. SHAPIRO:

Yes.

This —

this State Farm

4

instruction was broken out.

5

lawyers.

6

proper to put them all in one instructional basket.

7

That's what the form instructions said, and that's what

8

both parties here did.

9
10

That's an option for

But under the pattern instruction, it's quite

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

Thank you, counsel.

The case is submitted.

11

MR. SHAPIRO:

12

(Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the case in the

13

We thank the Court.

above-entitled matter was submitted.)

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 4
Over the last 25 years, Utah courts have consistently held that if a party fails to object to,
stipulates to, or submits incorrect jury instructions at the trial court level, then the party
has waived theirrightto appeal the instruction.
• State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, 1flf 60-63,114 P.3d 551 (failure to object and
stipulated to the instruction);
• State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 14, 86 P.3d 742 (party submitted incorrect
jury instruction to trial court);
• State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,fflf27-29, 70 P.3d 111 (stipulated to instruction);
• R. T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11,fflf10-11,40 P.3d 1119 (failure to object);
• Jones v. Cyprus Plateau Mineral Corporation, 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997)
(failure to object with specificity);
• Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988) (failure to object);
• King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 621 -22 (Utah 1987) (court held that party waived
objection to jury instruction since they failed to timely object);
• Penrod v. Carter, 137 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987) (failure to object);
• Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah 1985) (failure
to object with sufficient specificity);
This string citation includes both criminal and civil cases. The rules governing both are
nearly identical. See Utah R. Crim. P. 19; Utah R. Civ. P. 51.

• State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, f 12, 236 P.3d 155 (failure to object);
• State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191,ffl[11-12, 186 P.3d 1023 (failure to
object);
• State v. Bennett, 2008 UT App 126, *1 (unpublished decision, attached) (failure to
object);
• State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327,ffl[14-16, 143 P.3d 302 (stipulated to
incorrect jury instruction);
• Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101,fflf30-31, 158 P.3d 562 (failure to object);
• State v. Cox, 2007 UT App 317, \ 19, 169 P.3d 806 (failure to object);
• State v. Leber, 2007 UT App 273, \ 14, 167 P.3d 1091 (party submitted incorrect
jury instruction);
• State v. Harper, 2006 UT App 178,fflf12-13, 136 P.3d 1261 (failure to object);
• State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, \ 26, 153 P.3d 804 (failure to object);
• State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, \ 8, 132 P.3d 703 (failure to object);
• State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, 1f 12,63 P.3d 110 (stipulated to jury
instruction);
• Chapman v. Uintah County, 2003 UT App 383,ffif25-26, 81 P.3d 761 (stipulated
to jury instruction);

• State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, \ 39, 57 P.3d 1139 (failed to submit
instruction);
• State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 311,\ 21, 37 P.3d 1180 (stipulated to jury
instruction);
• State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, flf 54-55, 989 P.2d 1091 (stipulated to jury
instruction);
• State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 30, f 23,975 P.2d 469 (failure to object);
• State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (failure to object);
•

Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457,460-61 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) (failure to object with sufficient specificity);

• Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 747 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (failure to object);
• State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (party submitted the
jury instruction);
• Mann v. Wadsworth, 776 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (failure to object);
•

VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Machine Distributions, Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 964-65
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (failure to object).

